

Who Substitutes Service for Politics?

Assessing the Roles of Youth and Partisan Alienation in Americans' Forms of Civic Engagement

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Political scientists have expressed curiosity and concern over signs of change in Americans' modes of civic participation, especially among the young. For decades now, this literature has pointed to the coexistence of stagnant if not declining rates of participation in traditional political institutions and processes such as elections and campaigns, political parties, and mass-membership groups with persistently high if not also increasing rates of volunteerism (Macedo et al. 2005, Mann 1999, Shea 2015, Zukin et al. 2006, Bennett 1998). These coinciding trends have inspired speculation that these reflect a phenomenon in which Americans are substituting community service for traditional political action as a means of creating social change (Shea 2015, Walker 2000, Strama 1998, Galston and Levine 1998).

Scholars' chief concerns are twofold: While echoing norms that volunteering is a social good, some scholars worry that a large shift of attention and other resources from politics to service may undermine government action on problems that are too large for volunteers to solve (Eliasoph 2013, Rimmerman 2005). Still more frequently, they worry about what it signals about the health of American democracy. Indeed, many have speculated that alienation from a politics that is dominated by two polarized and uncivil parties and deemed inadequately responsive to youth's social concerns has prompted younger citizens to retreat from politics and seek change through other means (e.g., Bennett 2007; Chou et al. 2017; Dalton 2009; Loader, Vromen and Xenos 2014; Shea 2015). States Daniel Shea, "Social network-based activism and volunteer work have become placebos for a deep engagement in public affairs" (2015, 464).

Surprisingly, however, very little scholarship has examined relationships among age, political alienation, and variation in Americans' forms of civic engagement at the individual level. There is also disagreement in the literature on whether youth or other Americans have been withdrawing from politics in general, or just from *electoral* politics. Increasingly, for example,

scholars have characterized the participation of youth as a blend of activities including cause-oriented expressions of political voice, localized problem-solving endeavors, consumer activism and ostensibly nonpolitical volunteer work – but very little involvement with elections and established parties and interest groups (Dalton 2009, Loader, Vromen, and Xenos 2014, Chou et al. 2017, Sloam 2014).

This paper addresses that gap. Using the 2016 American National Election Study, it sorts Americans according to the mixes of political and nonpolitical activities through which they participate (or not) in civic life. It then analyzes whether and how variation in these civic engagement profiles is related to age, indicators of alienation from partisan politics, and other individual characteristics. In doing so, it aims to contribute empirical evidence toward assessment of the narrative that a politically alienated and disproportionately young segment of the U.S. public is substituting community service for political action.

Acknowledging challenges of testing it conclusively, the paper reports mixed support for this narrative. In the 2016 data, the share of American adults reporting community service but no political action is relatively small and better described as older and religiously devout than youthful. This civic engagement profile is associated with higher partisan alienation than most others involving political action. The most relevant brand of alienation is one based on affect, however, rather than ideological distance or willingness to identify with a party. Youth increases the odds of a political participation profile that includes expressive but no electoral activities. But perhaps surprisingly, for campaign-related activities beyond voting, there is little evidence that youth predicts disengagement from elections.

Community Service and (Types of) Political Action: Complements or Substitutes?

Speculation that Americans are substituting service for politics, or issue-based for electoral politics, contradicts the civic participation literature's traditional view that these forms of participation are complementary. Theoretically, this complementarity begins with the idea that participants in politics and ostensibly nonpolitical community service are both motivated by concerns about public problems (Han 2009, Strach 2012, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Participation is often conceived as developing along a pathway on which participation in community service – something American youth typically do before they are eligible to vote – increases exposure to problems and their human impact and prompts an interest in larger-scale change, leading to political activism (Rimmerman 2005, Eliasoph 2013). Indeed, analyses of survey data consistently find that involvement in one mode of civic participation – be that nonpolitical volunteer work, the exercise of political voice, activities undertaken to support or oppose a candidate for office, or something else, like consumer action or online political social networking – is strongly associated with involvement in others (Dalton 2009, Oser, Hooghe, and Marien 2013, Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, Strach 2012, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, Zukin et al. 2006). This is true even in cross-national evidence from democratic countries (Whiteley 2011).

At the same time, there is evidence suggesting that some discernible segment of the American public treats these different types of civic involvement as alternative routes to community betterment and social change. Detailed analysis of Americans' civic activities, for example, reveals distinct, if also overlapping, clusters. Zukin and colleagues identify three: electoral political participation, expressive political participation (involving the use of voice to influence policy or politics), and nonpolitical civic participation, such as volunteer work, active civic group membership, fundraising for charity, and community problem-solving activity

(Zukin et al. 2006, 56). Similarly, Dalton's (2009) factor analyses of activities in the political realm distinguish between activities related to elections and campaigns and those associated with cause-related activism such as contacting government officials about policy, signing petitions, and attending demonstrations. Dalton further observes that these two forms of political participation are predicted by different sets of attitudes about citizenship, and while the citizenship that predict expressive, cause-related activism also predict the performance of acts of service, while the citizenship norms that predict electoral activism do not.

Zukin and colleagues report that nontrivial proportions of Americans concentrate their civic activities in either the political or nonpolitical arena. Their examination of data from a national sample of Americans aged 15 and older in the 2002 National Civic Engagement Survey I found that 16 percent performed only nonpolitical civic activities, 20 percent performed only political (either electoral or expressive) activities, and 16 percent performed activities in both realms (16%); the rest they described as disengaged (48%) (Zukin et al. 2006, 64). Though the restriction of civic engagement to seemingly nonpolitical activities is often described as a characteristic of youth (Chou et al. 2017), Zukin et al.'s statistics on the prevalence of civic specialists show that most substantive distinction is not between the youngest generation and their elders, but between Americans born before 1946 and subsequent generations (Zukin et al. 2006, 188). Meanwhile, several qualitative case studies illustrate a phenomenon in which volunteers of varying ages address public problems like poverty (Bilous 2014), rape (Blackstone 2007), breast cancer (Blackstone 2004), and inadequate resources for education (Eliasoph 1998) through raising funds and awareness and providing direct services to affected populations, while describing their work as a route to change that is different from and superior to political activism.

Evidence that some discernible share of Americans are substituting service for political action also comes from studies indicating that some experiences previously shown or believed to foster political participation may not, in some circumstances, be doing so. A rigorous study of civics education by Kahne, Crow and Lee (2013) shows that high school service-learning fails to increase intentions to vote or to have any more than a small and uncertain impact on political interest, while it does predict future volunteerism and a limited, largely youth-focused set of expressive activities. Other studies have questioned the generalizability of a previously well-established link between participation in religious congregations (including volunteerism) and participation in politics and civic life outside of church, revealing denominational differences in the degree to which these forms of participation are complementary (Campbell 2004, Beyerlein and Hipp 2006). This latter group of studies offers additional clues that the phenomenon of “civic specialists” or “service politics” may reach well beyond youth, and be driven by factors beyond generational differences or stage in the life course.

Partisan Alienation and Forms of Participation

While often, although not always, limiting their focus to youth, scholars have offered many ideas about why some Americans may be substituting cause-related community service and expression for political participation. Certainly, some voices have blamed diminished involvement with traditional political institutions on apathy and laziness (for e.g., cited in Chou et al. 2017). Scholars also acknowledge the increasing availability of diverse low-cost, low-commitment forms of political and civic engagement (Shea 2015).

Yet the volunteer work and other local problem-solving activity believed to be central to this newer brand of civic engagement is arguably neither low in cost nor commitment, especially

relative to participation in election campaigns, political parties, or issue advocacy groups, leading scholars to explore potential causes outside the individual. Some have proposed that an engagement pattern characterized by individual acts of service and expression fits more easily than traditional group-based political activism into the schedules and mindsets of Americans who are increasingly likely to be juggling one or more jobs, increasingly worried about economic insecurity and insufficient family time, and increasingly inclined to understand their daily concerns as having individual rather than collective solutions (Bennett 1998). Others suggest that promoters of charitable projects have successfully marketed their work to portray social problems as more tractable than they are made to appear when politicians debate ways to solve them (Strach 2012, Eliasoph 2013). This increases their appeal to a (disproportionately young) type of citizen that is believed to be greatly concerned about and eager for solidarity with the less fortunate (Dalton 2009), attracted to action and projects (Dalton 2009, Loader, Vromen, and Xenos 2014), and skeptical of government's relevance (Zukin et al. 2006) and problem-solving capacity, especially relative to the sense of accomplishment they derive from service (Shea 2015). Another explanation may lie in the types of civics classes and service-learning experiences to which students are exposed as they come of age: service-learning civics experiences are popular, but pale at promoting political participation relative to programs emphasizing the discussion of political issues (Kahne, Crow, and Lee 2013). Meanwhile, the extent to which service learning facilitates political engagement depends on features of the academic component, most importantly, whether it makes space for the volunteers to discuss political issues and link them to their service experience (Nesbit and Brudney 2010, Rimmerman 2005).

Scholars appear to have devoted the most serious attention to the possibility that changes in young Americans' and perhaps others' forms of civic engagement stem from alienation from formal political institutions, actors, and processes. Perhaps foremost among these rank established political parties, from whom Loader, Vromen and Xenos perceive young citizens' "growing disillusionment" (2014, 143) and "growing estrangement" (2014, 148). Drawing from a large comparative literature on youth engagement emphasizing the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia, Mark Chou and co-authors identify a number of grievances with established parties and the professional political world in which they operate, including that youth and young adults perceive them as corrupt, irrelevant, and unwilling or incapable at representing them and addressing the kinds of issues they care most about. In response, they argue, youth have eschewed conventional politics and sought to make a difference on the problems they care about through an alternative politics that features cause-oriented expression and direct action, including volunteerism, and that unfolds largely in nongovernmental venues. Citing research by Jessica Nasrallah, they suggest that this phenomenon may be keenest in countries, like the United States, where winner-take-all elections limit the number and diversity of parties that gain power (Chou et al. 2017). It is up to parties, Dalton argues, to engage youth more extensively in elections by demonstrating "that they are as politically relevant and effective as working for a non-governmental organization, and as rewarding to their participants" (Dalton 2009, 174).

A focus on the party system as a potential key factor in any substitution of service for politics in the United States makes sense in light of several observations and considerations. Arguably, one of the most salient changes in American politics over the last few decades has been the polarization of political elites (Layman et al. 2010) and, increasingly, citizens (Mason

2018, Abramowitz 2010) along partisan and (increasingly constrained) ideological lines, a phenomenon that has been accompanied by escalation in the combativeness and “tribalism” of politics (Mason 2018). Shea (2015, 475) suggests that partisan conflict has failed to mobilize young citizens as it has for other Americans, concluding: “Few generations of Americans have come of political age during a period of such deep partisan divisions. Yet they show they [sic] little affinity for partisan labels, nor do they seem inclined to vilify those on the other side of issues that they care about.” In the 2016 election, observations of continued low and falling levels of political party identification among young Americans prompted the Center for Information & Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE) to speculate that these reflect “disagreement and discontent with both parties” (CIRCLE Staff 2016, 3), and to warn that young citizens’ alienation from politics may grow if their propensity to identify with parties continues to decline (11).

Theoretically, partisan conflict is hard to escape when working for change through mainstream political institutions, for the system’s two major parties structure much of contemporary American politics. Winner-take-all elections, in particular, are inherently adversarial. By participating in them, a citizen takes a side – and if efforts to support or oppose a given candidate extend beyond the act of voting, they often, to some degree, involve making that position public (Klar and Krupnikov 2016). Though weak partisan attachments may present less of a barrier to participation in efforts to influence policy through political voice, for these typically involve endorsement of an interest or an issue position rather than a political party or ideology, there is reason to believe that partisan polarization could also poison this form of political engagement. Interest groups have shown increasing tendencies to align themselves informally with a particular political party (Roof 2008, Heaney 2010), and issue advocacy often

entails attempts to influence (at least at the level of the US Congress) a policymaking environment often characterized by high levels of partisanship, ideological conflict, and gridlock (Sinclair 2014). Working within such a system to produce change, whether through elections or voice, may effectively force an individual to align publicly with a partisan side that may not reflect her identity or ideology, and that she may not like, producing cognitive dissonance. Partisan gridlock may test her patience while exposing her to a degree of conflict to which she may be averse. It is for this type of citizen, admirers of the voluntary sector suggest, for whom community service offers “a refuge from (and alternative to)” politics (Galston and Levine 1998, 36). While ideological conflict grinds Washington to a halt, community-based nonprofits are perceived to be solving problems in ways that transcend partisan divides (Solo and Pressberg 1998, Dionne 2000).

Research has increasingly demonstrated the importance to electoral political participation of various forms of attachment to either of the United States’ two major parties. Early looks at political engagement and participation in a polarized era found aggregate increases, even for people claiming moderate or no ideology (Hetherington 2008), but carved out exceptions for Independents (Abramowitz 2010) and citizens whose policy views mixed liberal positions on one major dimension (social or economic) of public policy with conservative positions on the other (Hussey 2012, Carmines, Ensley, and Wagner 2011). Later research has not only reinforced the higher participation associated with identification as a Democrat or Republican, liberal or conservative, but has also shed light on the mechanisms producing these patterns. Klar and Krupnikov (2016) present convincing evidence of Independents’ avoidance of electoral activities that involve publicly taking a partisan side, such as displaying a campaign sticker, and how this is conditioned by self-consciousness over how others perceive them. Birkhead and Hershey

(2017) find that Democrats and Republicans are almost always significantly more likely than Independents to engage in the six electoral activities they study – but that ideological extremity exerts an even stronger positive relationship than party identification does with these variables. Mason (2018) downplays the role of ideology in political participation and other political behaviors by arguing that ideology – at least when measured with self-labeling – is a form of social identity that has become tightly bundled with partisan as well as other social group identities. She shows that the extent to which partisanship is aligned with other social identities, much more so than extremity of ideology or issue positions, predicts levels of political participation, and seems to do so via emotional responses to political stimuli.

While a link between partisan attachment and participation in elections has been well-established – even if consensus does not yet exist on its mechanisms – we know much less about whether and how Americans’ relationships to increasingly ideologically constrained and polarized political parties factor into their practice of other forms of civic engagement. Chou and colleagues’ argument regarding youth may apply just as readily to the wider mass of citizens who do not participate in elections: they are a diverse lot, encompassing the truly apathetic as well as those who have rejected conventional, professional politics for a variety of principled reasons. They also vary in the extent and form of any efforts they make to build a better world through means other than politics (Chou et al. 2017). Such premises inspire questions not yet adequately addressed in the empirical literature, such as: Do diminished party attachments reduce participation in non-electoral forms of politics, like expressive issue advocacy? Does greater alienation from politics or the party system, assuming an association with decreased electoral engagement, appear to increase the extent of engagement in non-electoral or non-political forms of participation? Does variation in the strength or nature of Americans’

attachments to one of the major political parties predict variation in the mix of political and nonpolitical activities (if any) that citizens do? Considering that “alienation” is a multi-faceted concept (Finifter 1970, Southwell 2008), and the flaws scholars attribute to American parties are multiple as well, it also merits asking whether some aspects of alienation from partisan politics – such as lack of a shared identity or perceptions of insufficient policy or ideological representation – may matter more than others in Americans’ mix of civic activities.

Research has established some contextual conditions that are needed for or consistent with a scenario in which an increasingly polarized party system has prompted some Americans to substitute community service for political activism. Political scientists have long recognized Americans’ tendency to attribute their political (as well as nonpolitical) voluntary activity to desires to help others and contribute to the betterment of their community (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 117-119, Dalton 2009, Han 2009). Some polls show volunteers’ explicit agreement that they view their service as a means of addressing a political problem (Zukin et al. 2006, 194-196). Scholars’ reports on exercises performed with students (Walker 2000) or research subjects (Hays 2007) similarly suggest that both activities are seen as offering opportunities to achieve change-related goals, but also that they are associated with distinct values, rewards, and experiences, including and perhaps most especially the relative degree of conflict versus cooperation involved. Several case studies of volunteers and others involved in community-based social action also discuss distinctions their subjects make between the realms of service and politics in the course of defining their work as nonpolitical. Most commonly, these include subjects’ tendencies to associate their voluntarism with care for people and productive, concrete problem-solving while associating politics with conflict, bickering, stalemate, and

assertions of power (Bilous 2014, Blackstone 2004, Eliasoph 1998, Hussey 2014, Blackstone 2007).

Empirical evidence that alienation from the party system deters political participation and promotes the substitution of service is, however, thin. From the qualitative cases, perhaps the most explicit discussion of political parties arises from among the young, evangelical women studied by Adrianne Bilous: some of those “servant-activists” shared perceptions of a disconnect, if not cross-pressure, between their desire to advocate for poor and marginalized people and the Republican loyalty of their relatives and co-religionists that Bilous cites in why they pour their care about people and problems into service provision rather than conventional politics. Shea’s (2015) argument that a mix of disdain for and alienation from partisan conflict and doubts about the capacity of politics to produce social change has contributed to Millennials’ substitution of service for politics rests primarily on examination of these attitudes and behaviors in isolation; no attempt is made to link them to each other at the individual level.

While Zukin and coauthors (2006) do attempt some individual-level analysis of the relationship between Americans’ attitudes about politics and the extent of their participation in the civic, voice, and electoral realms, some features of their analysis limit the light it can shed on claims about partisan alienation and service politics. First, indicators for their key independent variables do not isolate partisan alienation from other attitudes about government and the political system. Second, their dependent variables do not take into account variation in the *mix* of individuals’ political and nonpolitical participation; they only measure, in isolation, the extent to which individuals participate in the civic, voice, or electoral realms. Results, however, show little consistency with what we might expect to observe if partisan alienation is prompting the replacement of political action with service. Among a sample of young adults, a factor score of

negative views about politics exhibits a positive but small and statistically insignificant correlation with voluntary organization memberships, as well as small and *positive* bivariate correlations with several indicators of political participation. Multivariate analyses of data from a nationally representative sample of adults and adolescents find that negative attitudes about the fairness of the political system are not significantly associated with electoral, expressive, or nonpolitical civic participation, while positive attitudes about government's role and capacity matter only for participation in expressive activities, weakening it. The authors suggest that failure to participate in politics does not signal an explicit rejection of government by citizens, but rather varied mixes of reasons about which citizens are generally unreflective.

Research Design

Adding to the challenge of testing whether alienation from parties and politics prompts the substitution of service for political action is that this phenomenon is difficult to empirically isolate and observe. People volunteer in their communities for very different reasons, for example, and there is no reason to believe that Americans' enthusiasm for a political party will discourage such behavior. It is also difficult to flag individuals who – if facing a different menu of partisan choices – might want to channel the interest in bettering the world that their community service presumably demonstrates through mainstream political processes. While plausible candidates could be civic specialists who combine relatively high levels of political knowledge and interest with high levels of alienation, it is unlikely that civic specialists would match the political knowledge and interest of those active in politics. This is because scholars believe that political knowledge and interest are dynamic and partly endogenous to political participation. This paper claims no immunity from those challenges. What it does do is more

modest: It identifies those Americans whose civic participation consists only of community service (henceforth called “service specialists,”) describes their characteristics and prevalence in the electorate, and tests how indicators of partisan alienation – and other known predictors of political participation – differentiate this civic engagement profile from profiles that involve ostensibly political activity or no civic involvement at all. It also later explores whether partisan alienation and youth contribute more importantly to a politics-service distinction or instead to the practice of electoral versus voice-oriented political participation.

My operationalization of “partisan alienation” begins with what binds citizens to political parties. Existing scholarship tends to emphasize (strength of) social group identity (including party itself as a form of group identity) (Brader, Tucker, and Therriault 2009, Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002, Mason 2018), shared ideologies or policy beliefs (Carsey and Layman 2006, Levendusky 2009, Webster and Abramowitz 2017), and affect (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012, Iyengar and Westwood 2015, Mason 2013). Lower levels of each of these – with respect to both Democrats and Republicans – may signal a psychological sense of separation or “alienation” from the party system. Consequently, this paper tests three hypotheses about the relationship between partisan alienation and service specialization that correspond to these different aspects of alienation:

H1: As strength of partisan affiliation increases, the likelihood of specializing in service will decrease.

H2: As ideological distance from both major parties increases, the likelihood of specializing in service will increase.

H3: As disaffection toward both of the major parties increases, the likelihood of specializing in service will increase.

Given widespread belief that service specialization shows up disproportionately among young Americans, this paper also tests a fourth hypothesis:

H4: As age increases, the likelihood of specializing in service will decrease.

This paper tests these hypotheses with data from the 2016 American National Election Study. The survey queried respondents about their participation in multiple types of political and nonpolitical civic activities, in addition to collecting several viable measures of alienation from the two major political parties. Most analyses in this paper employ all available data from the full sample of ANES respondents, 1,181 of whom were interviewed face-to-face and 3,090 of whom completed the study online. All analyses are weighted with the standard ANES post-stratified combined sample weight.

Table 1 summarizes the items that form my indicators of civic engagement and notes the weighted percentage of the full ANES sample that reported having performed each activity. Note that voting is not included among these activities, thus inflating the percentage of Americans my data will label as “not engaged.” This analysis instead considers whether and how Americans participate in civic life beyond the relatively low-cost, highly normative, and notoriously over-reported act of voting.¹

The primary dependent variable is a four-category indicator of whether a respondent participated in a) none of activities listed in table 1, b) only nonpolitical activities, c) only political activities, or d) both nonpolitical and political activities. Subsequent analyses employ alternative dependent variables that are described further when they are used: the percentage of total activities allocated to service and an alternative four-category civic engagement variable

¹ My civic engagement measure also excludes a question soliciting a count of organizational memberships. This is because the question explicitly lumps political with nonpolitical organizations. Though this too will inflate the percentage of Americans labeled as “not engaged,” it will not do so to a large degree. Over 80 percent of respondents reporting none of the activities in table 1 also reported zero organizational memberships.

that differentiates between whether political participation is electoral or only expressive in nature.

[Table 1 about here]

Figure 1 displays the civic engagement profiles of the American public, as represented by 2016 ANES respondents. It offers little evidence of widespread service specialization. A plurality of respondents (43 percent) reports participation in both political and nonpolitical activities. Political specialists (27 percent) substantially outnumber service specialists (11 percent). The rest of the sample (19 percent) reports none of the activities listed in table 1. Overall, 54 percent report engaging in at least one act of volunteer service or community participation, while 70 percent report at least one act of political participation. Americans averaged 1.0 community participation activities out of a possible three and 1.6 political participation activities out of a possible eight.²

[Figure 1 about here]

Drilling down into the types of political participation Americans report, there is also little evidence that Americans are eschewing electoral participation en masse. A comparable share of Americans reports participating in at least one form of electoral political participation (53 percent) as reports participating in at least one form of expressive political participation (52 percent).

² It is possible that the greater prevalence of political activities to community participation activities results from measurement: the 2016 ANES asked about a greater number of political activities than community participation activities. On the other hand, ANES's community participation items are arguably broader in the types of activities they might encompass than the political participation items, and it is possible that the volunteer service, community work, or community meetings respondents report could be political in nature, thus overstating the extent of Americans' nonpolitical community participation. A second measurement-related concern is that many of the activities that would suffice to code a respondent as a political participant (e.g., sending a political message over social media, displaying a political sticker) arguably involve less of a commitment than any of the activities needed to code a respondent as a nonpolitical participant. When comparing two activities that involve investment of time, volunteer service and campaign work, the percentage of respondents reporting any volunteer work (42 percent) far outstrips those reporting any campaign work (3 percent). The ANES did not collect information, however, on the frequency with which respondents engaged in any form of participation, or the hours they committed. As the paper proceeds, it reports on various sensitivity analyses designed to address these flaws.

percent). The mean numbers of electoral and expressive activities Americans report (out of a possible four in each category) are also similar: 0.72 electoral activities and 0.84 expressive activities.

Independent variables from H1 and H4 are measured straightforwardly. Age is measured in years. Strength of partisanship is a four-point scale ranging from 1 (pure independent) to 4 (strong Democrat or Republican), deriving from ANES' standard party identification question. The average age of the weighted 2016 ANES sample was 47.4 years, while strength of partisanship took on a mean value of 2.9, roughly equivalent to a party identifier who did not describe that affiliation as "strong."

I estimate the extent to which a respondent shares a major party's policy preferences using 7-point scales ranging from strongly liberal to strongly conservative on which respondents placed themselves, the Democratic Party, and the Republican Party. The specific variable I used is the absolute value of the distance between the value respondents assigned to themselves and the value assigned to the political party placed closest to them on that seven-point scale. Across all 2016 ANES respondents, this variable ranged in value from 0 to 6, but assumed a mean of 1.1.³

To test H3, I construct what I call a Major Party Disaffect Index. This measure is intended to tap affective dimensions of citizens' attachment to the American two-party system. The index incorporates data from ANES batteries soliciting a) whether respondents report anything they like or dislike about each party and its presidential nominee, b) ratings of the

³ To avoid a large loss of sample size that would have resulted from the respondents who initially declined to place themselves on the 7-point liberal-conservative scale, I used information from the three-point (liberal, moderate, conservative) scale that interviewers prompted respondents to place themselves upon if they "have to choose." I assigned liberals a 2, moderates a 4, and conservatives a 6. The mean perceived ideological distance from the closest major party remains 1.1 points regardless of whether these respondents are included.

Democratic and Republican parties and their presidential nominees on 0-100 degree “feeling thermometers,” and c) whether respondents describe themselves as “close to” the Democratic or Republican Party. The index’s values range from 0-1 and represent the mean of as many as five dummy variables for which the respondent provided data. Those five variables are:

- Whether R reported liking nothing about the Democratic *and* the Republican Party (29.5 percent);
- Whether R reported liking nothing about the 2016 Democratic *and* the Republican presidential candidates (22.0 percent);
- Whether R rated both the Democratic and the Republican Parties at or below the midpoint, 50 degrees, on the feeling thermometer (24.0 percent);
- Whether R rated both the 2016 Democratic and the Republican presidential candidates at or below the midpoint, 50 degrees, on the feeling thermometer (22.7 percent);
- Whether R denied thinking of himself or herself as “close to” the Democratic or Republican Party (48.2 percent).⁴

Cronbach’s alpha was 0.67.⁵ The mean value of the index for the weighted ANES sample was 0.29.

⁴ An initial question asked whether “you usually think of yourself as close to any particular party?” A follow-up question asked those responding affirmatively to name the party. Along with those who answered the first question with a “no,” I coded those who said they thought of themselves as close to a political party other than the Democratic and Republican parties as not close to one of the two major parties.

⁵ I also developed and discarded a 7-item version of the index where the two additional items were whether R reported disliking something about both the Democratic and Republican parties (40.2 percent) and whether R reported disliking something about both parties’ presidential nominees (38.8 percent). These two items, however, did not scale well with the rest. Whether a respondent reported disliking something about both parties was negatively correlated with the other variables. Whether a respondent reported disliking something about both candidates was positively but very weakly related to the rest, such that Cronbach’s alpha improved with the exclusion of that item. In a factor analysis, these two items loaded heavily onto a second discernible factor that appeared to especially capture those Americans who, while appearing to have some affinity with and affection for one of the major parties, nonetheless identified things they disliked about that party and its presidential candidate.

In the next section, I estimate a series of multinomial logit and ordinary least squares regressions Americans' civic engagement profiles. These models control for gender (male or female), race (white or non-white), educational attainment (five categories), household income (28 categories), whether the respondents attends religious services weekly, self-reported frequency of "attention to politics and elections," and a three-item political knowledge index.⁶

Results

Table 2 presents demographic and political profiles of Americans based on their type of civic engagement: the non-engaged, service specialists, political specialists, and dual activists. While there is little difference across the four groups in mean perceived ideological distance from the closest major party, notable differences emerge in identification with and disaffection toward the Democratic and Republican parties. Both service specialists and the non-engaged fall below the two groups of politically active Americans in their strength of party identification. Service specialists and the non-engaged also score considerably higher than political specialists and dual activists on the Major Party Disaffection Index, although service specialists show somewhat greater affect toward one or both of the major parties than the non-engaged do, and this difference is statistically significant. Contrary to stereotypes, service specialists are not significantly younger than other participants. The relatively higher mean age shown in table 2 also does not reflect or obscure extreme values: not shown, Americans under age 25 actually make up a smaller share of service specialists (9.5 percent) than any other group (11.5-13.7 percent). Service specialists exceed the other three groups, however, in their shares of females and weekly church attenders. They report higher levels of income and educational attainment than political specialists and the

⁶ This index counts of the number of correct responses to questions concerning the majority parties in the House and Senate and, out of four options, the federal budget category on which the federal government spends the least.

non-engaged, but less than dual activists report, especially with regard to income. Factual political knowledge increases steadily as one moves across the columns from the non-engaged to dual activists; professed interest in politics also increases in that order, but with that variable, a bright line divides the two groups that are not politically active from the two groups that are.

[Table 2 about here]

Dual activists' leading levels of such participation-facilitating variables as education, income, political interest, and political knowledge suggest that their participation may differ from other groups not just qualitatively, in the mix of activities performed, but quantitatively, in the number. Indeed, this is the case: dual activists report a statistically significantly higher mean number of service activities than service specialists and a statistically significantly higher mean number of political activities than political specialists. Larger percentages of them also report voting and being registered to vote. The difference is statistically significant even relative to political specialists. Meanwhile, though political specialists report higher mean levels of voting and voter registration than service specialists, the differences are not statistically significant. Dual activists also far outstrip others in their likelihood of reporting any consumer activism, that is, that they "bought or declined to buy a certain product or service because of the social or political values of the company that provides it" at least "once in a while." They are more likely to report ever discussing politics with family and friends, and those that do report those discussions as occurring more frequently than those fitting other participation profiles, including political specialists. Service specialists are less likely to report discussing politics, and do so less frequently, than political specialists do, but on these items they behave somewhat more like political specialists than the non-engaged.

Table 3 presents results from multinomial logit models in which respondents' civic participation profile is the dependent variable and service specialists are the base category.

[Table 3 about here]

Here, neither strength of partisanship nor perceived ideological distance from the major political parties significantly differentiates service specialists from political specialists, dual activists, or the civically disengaged. Not shown in the table, strength of partisanship also fails to differentiate between any other pair of civic engagement profiles. Meanwhile, adding to the evidence against hypothesis 2, the coefficient on perceived ideological distance does attain statistical significance in some comparisons of other civic engagement profiles, but in a manner not fully consistent with theory. As distance between a respondent's placement of self and the closest political party on a seven-point liberal-conservative scale increases, the likelihood of being disengaged rather than active in both service and politics significantly decreases ($b = -0.1498$, $p < 0.022$). Increasing perceived ideological distance from a party is also significantly and positively associated with the likelihood of being a dual activist rather than a political specialist ($b = 0.1229$, $p < 0.032$). Figures 2a and 2b summarize the relatively weak relationships of strength of party identification and perceived ideological distance from a party with Americans' civic engagement profiles.

[Figures 2a-2d about here]

The model offers much stronger support for the role of an affective measure of affinity with political parties, measured by the Major Party Disaffection Index. Consistent with hypothesis three, increases in this measure are associated with statistically significant and substantively large increases in the odds of specializing in service rather than specializing in politics or reporting both political and community service activity. There is also some indication that extent

of affective attachment to the major parties differentiates between service specialists and the civically disengaged, such that an increase in disaffection is associated with a marginally statistically significant ($p < 0.071$) increase in the odds of being disengaged rather than specializing in service.

Figure 2c illustrates the changes in the predicted probability of each civic engagement profile across values of this variable, while all other covariates are fixed at their means. At the minimum level of disaffection from the major parties, the model predicts a 10 percent probability of disengagement and 9 percent probability of service specialization. As disaffection rises to its maximum value, the predicted probability of service specialization nearly doubles while the predicted probability of disengagement triples. Both increases are statistically significant at $p < .05$. Even at the maximum level of disaffection for the major parties, however, the model predicts that Americans are more likely to participate in politics than not, either as political specialists (22.6 percent) or dual activists (30.3 percent).

The model offers virtually no support for H4, concerning younger Americans' alleged tendency to gravitate toward service and away from political activism as a means of making change in the world. The statistically significant negative coefficient on age in the rightmost column of table 3 indicates that as age increases, all else being equal, the odds of being dually engaged in community service and political activism relative to being a service specialist *decrease*. Age is not significantly associated with a specialization in politics rather than service, nor with the likelihood that an individual will specialize in service rather than being disengaged. In comparisons between civic engagement profiles not shown in table 3, increasing age predicts statistically significant increases in the odds of being disengaged rather than a political specialist

($p < .028$) or dual activist ($p < .000$), and in the odds of being a political specialist rather than a dual activist ($p < .000$).

Figure 2d shows how the predicted probabilities of each civic engagement profile change with age when all other variables are held at their means. For the youngest adults, the dominant participation profile is predicted to be that which involves the most diverse mix of activities, the dual activist profile. The predicted probability of this activist profile falls from 58 percent at the minimum age of 18 to 31 percent at the sample's maximum age of 90. Meanwhile, the predicted probability of disengagement rises from 10 percent to 22.5 percent, and the probability of specialization in service from 8 to 15 percent, as age moves from its minimum to its maximum value; the small increase in the predicted probability of political specialization is not statistically significant.

The only variable in the model that increases the likelihood of service specialization at some level of statistical significance relative to all other engagement profiles is church attendance. With all other variables fixed at their means, the model predicts that attending religious services on at least a weekly basis increases the likelihood of service specialization by over seven percentage points. Unlike other variables, increases in which have tended to predict higher levels of civic engagement regardless of the form (that is, increases in the likelihood of any mix of political or service engagement relative to no engagement), church attendance is associated with highly statistically significant and substantively large decreases in the likelihood of political specialization, even relative to disengagement. Overall, with covariates fixed at their means, the model predicts for weekly church attendees a decrease of over 17 percentage points in the likelihood of a political specialist profile. This appears to be mostly driven by church attendance's outsized contribution to the likelihood that an individual performs community

service, as the model overall predicts a nearly 14 percentage point increase in the likelihood of dual activism for weekly churchgoers, relative to those who attend less frequently.

Of the remaining variables, neither income, race, nor gender significantly predicts the likelihood of a service specialist profile rather than one of the others. These variables also mostly fail to differentiate between other pairs of civic engagement profiles; the exceptions are a marginally significant ($p<.056$) increase in the likelihood of dual activism relative to political specialization for females and significant ($p<0.006$) or marginally significant ($p<0.082$) increases in the odds of dual activism relative to political specialization and disengagement, respectively, associated with increases in household income. Increasing educational attainment seems to pull individuals toward community service participation, but without the decrease in political activity suggested by the church attendance coefficients: increasing education is associated with statistically significant increases in the likelihood of a service specialist profile rather than a disengaged or political specialist profile, but does not significantly distinguish service specialists from dual activists. All else being equal, higher levels of political knowledge are associated with the likelihood of reporting any political activity – whether alone or in combination with community service – relative to reporting no civic activity. They do not significantly differentiate political specialists or dual activists from service specialists. Interest in politics, on the other hand, does: higher levels of it are associated with statistically significant increases in the likelihood of political specialist or dual activist profiles rather than a service specialist (or disengaged) profile. Increasing political interest, meanwhile, does not significantly change the odds of service specialization rather than civic disengagement.

The Service-Politics Balance among Dual Activists

The preceding analysis has been limited in that the data tell us whether Americans report engaging in some activity of a particular type, not the amount of time they devote to political and service activity. We might approximate such an analysis, however, by considering the relative numbers of activities reported from each realm by dual activists – assuming that percentage of total civic engagement activities reported from each realm roughly corresponds to how respondents allocate their time and attention among these realms. Respondents fitting this civic engagement profile likely vary in how heavily the balance of their activities tilts toward political action or community service. If alienation from the party system depresses political participation while leading Americans to seek outlets in service, we should find support for modified versions of hypotheses 1-3 among these dual activists: As strength of partisanship increases, the percentage of civic activities devoted to service should decrease. Likewise, as perceived ideological distance from and disaffection for the major political parties increase, the percentage of activities devoted to service should increase. If youth is associated with a preference for service over political activism, these data should also support a modified version of H4: As age increases, the percentage of activities devoted to service should decrease.

To test these hypotheses, I ran for the 1,507 dual activists in the ANES an ordinary least squares regression in which the dependent variable was the percentage of civic engagement activities characterized as service rather than politics. For these dual activists, the percentage of total activities devoted to service ranged from 11 to 75 percent, with a mean of 46 percent. Total numbers of activities ranged between two and 13, while the percentage of activities devoted to service ranged from 11 to 75 percent. Results are in table 4, and offer little support for the main hypotheses. Strength of partisanship (H1) is not a statistically significant predictor of the percentage of activities devoted to service. Perceived ideological distance from a major party

(H2) is marginally statistically significant ($p < .068$), but in the opposite of the hypothesized direction. With increasing disaffection for the major parties, the percentage of activities dual activists allocate to service increases, but this also is significant at only the .10 level ($p < .077$). Contradicting H4, previously observed patterns regarding age continue to hold, with each additional year of age associated with a statistically significant 0.12 percentage point increase in the percentage of activities devoted to service. Meanwhile, weekly church attendance is associated with a statistically significant five percentage-point increase in service's share of activities. The percentage of activities devoted to service increases significantly or marginally significantly with income and for non-whites, while it decreases significantly with political interest. Overall, however, with an R-squared value of just 0.075, the model leaves much variation unexplained.

Electoral versus Issue-Oriented Participation

Thus far, data suggest that concerns about a disenchanted and disproportionately youthful segment of the electorate fleeing from political participation to community service may be overly pessimistic, underestimating Americans' willingness to engage the political system in spite of their weak ties to the parties that dominate it. Political participation, however, takes on varying forms. While observing that they are correlated, Zukin and colleagues differentiate between participatory acts aimed at influencing elections and those involving the exercise of "public voice," or "the ways citizens give expression to their views on public issues" (2006, 54) through activities such as contacting government officials, petitioning, and protesting. Russell Dalton (2009) has argued that it is the electoral realm of politics only from which youth show signs of disengagement. He credits American youth with practicing a model of "engaged citizenship" that

fuses expressive, issue-oriented political activity with nonpolitical altruistic behavior, problem-solving efforts in their local communities, and consumer activism. Thus for Dalton and others making similar observations (Chou et al. 2017), the key distinction is not between political and nonpolitical participation, but between electoral participation and other, often cause-oriented, forms of political or civic engagement.

I thus created a revised, four-category typology of Americans' civic engagement profiles. This typology left service specialists and the non-engaged in place but reshuffled the politically active into the "electorally engaged" – those reporting any of the activities pertaining to election campaigns listed in table – and the "only expressively engaged" – those reporting some expressive political activity from table 1 but no electoral activity. Fifty-four percent of the sample qualifies as electorally engaged, while 17 percent qualifies as expressively engaged.

A cross-tabulation of this measure across three age groups – 18-25, 25-64, and 65 and older – generally fails to return the expected differences. For example, shown in table 5, Americans over age 65 are only slightly more likely than Americans under age 25 (57 percent versus 55 percent) to report any electoral political participation beyond voting. The youngest age group is somewhat more likely than the oldest (17 versus 14 percent) to report a participation profile containing expressive but no electoral political activity, but this profile is just as common in Americans aged 25-64 as it is among younger adults.

[Table 5 about here]

Figure 3 reports changes in predicted probabilities of each revised civic engagement profile associated with a minimum-to-maximum value increase in each of the variables from H1-H4, plus church attendance. The underlying model is a multinomial logit with the same independent variables identified in table 3. With all covariates set at their means, increasing age

is indeed associated with a statistically significant decrease in the likelihood of a participatory profile that includes expressive but not electoral activities – but, perhaps surprisingly, it is also associated with an even larger, statistically significant decrease in the likelihood of reporting electoral activities other than voting. In the multinomial logit, age does not significantly alter the odds of a political participation profile that includes electoral rather than only expressive political activities, nor does it alter the odds of a service specialist profile rather than disengagement, but it is statistically significant for all other pairs of outcomes. Of the three measures of alienation from the party system, the affect-driven measure continues to carry the explanatory load. In the underlying model, it significantly alters the relative odds of every pair of outcomes except for service specialists versus the expressively engaged at least at the .10 level (service specialists versus the civically disengaged) or higher. Growing disaffection with both major political parties is associated with a large (35 percentage points) and statistically significant decrease in the likelihood of reporting any electoral activity, and with statistically significant increases in the predicted probabilities of each of the three other profiles. Disaffection toward both parties has modest and similarly sized estimated impacts on the likelihood of expressively engaged or service specialist profiles, while much more dramatically increasing the predicted likelihood of non-engagement. Weekly church attendance is associated with a statistically significant increase in the predicted probability of a service specialist profile only, and does so in the underlying model relative to all three other profiles.

[Figure 3 about here]

Discussion

The extent to which youth or other Americans are fleeing from politics to service appears to be overblown. The 12 percent of U.S. adults in 2016 who reported service in their communities but no attempts to influence elections (beyond voting) or exercise political voice are far outnumbered by the shares of Americans who do report one or both of these forms of political participation. Contrary to conventional wisdom, service specialization is not a youth-driven phenomenon; it is instead more characteristic of an older and more religiously devout demographic.

While my models indicate that increasing alienation from established political parties predicts increasing odds of service specialization relative to political specialization or activity in political and nonpolitical civic realms, they suggest a nuanced understanding of the relationship between partisan alienation and political participation. First, to the extent that rising alienation predicts a flight from politics to service, it is chiefly from *electoral* politics to service; rising alienation is also associated with increased odds with that political participation will take only expressive rather than electoral forms. Somewhat consistent with a service substitution narrative, rising political knowledge does not predict increased odds of political participation relative to service specialization, as it does relative to disengagement; there is also some uncertainty as to whether increasing alienation increases the odds of disengagement relative to service specialization. Rising political interest, on the other hand, fails to change the odds of service specialization relative to disengagement while it does increase the odds of political participation.⁷

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⁷ The question the 2016 ANES used to measure political interest, however, specifically solicits interest in elections and politics rather than the general interest in politics and government asked about in some earlier surveys, however, which may not be a good candidate for tapping latent interest in public affairs.

Another important part of that nuance is that some forms of partisan alienation are more closely linked to political or civic disengagement than others. Here, there is both good news and bad news for those concerned about implications for American democracy. The good news is that the form of alienation that matters may not necessarily be a product of our institutions. All else being equal, neither strength of willingness to associate oneself with a major political party, nor perceptions of ideological distance from the major political parties predict political or civic disengagement. Perceptions of increased ideological distance from the major parties, if anything, predict greater participation in politics. This suggests that the two-party system sustained by winner-take-all elections and other institutional features – despite its theoretical potential to produce perceptions of exclusion and inadequate representation on issues – is not necessarily a major factor in American political disengagement, at least not for those reasons. The aspect of alienation that is more closely linked to the “substitution” of service or even expressive political action for (electoral) political engagement is more emotional than cognitive: citizens claim to dislike or feel no warmth or closeness toward both major political parties and their standard bearers. This is not terribly surprising given the mounting body of research elevating affect over ideology as a driver of partisan polarization. The bad news is there is no obvious institutional fix to something as seemingly subjective as affect-based alienation.

Of course, these arguments about alienation rest on the heroic assumption that political attitudes precede behavior. This is not only theoretically and empirically questionable, but also potentially undermined by the ANES’ cross-sectional design and a measurement strategy that asks about participation over the previous 12 months while measuring attitudes as of the time of the survey. Future, superior research would examine the questions in this paper with panel data.

The perhaps surprising findings regarding age and participation call for further investigation, as does the intriguing emergence of weekly church attendance as a predictor of service specialization. Preliminary, supplemental analyses not reported in the body of this paper suggest that they are not entirely unique to 2016. Replication of this data analysis in the 2012 ANES, despite some small differences in question wording and availability, yields quite similar findings. Among the differences, younger ages – while not associated with less political or overall civic engagement – were more closely associated with a service specialist profile while older ages were more closely associated with a political specialist profile. Church attendance was strongly associated with service specialization in 2012 and 2016, but both of these election years featured Republican presidential nominees carrying serious liabilities in their appeal to the evangelical Christians who might counted on for campaign activism (Mitt Romney for his Mormon faith and Donald Trump for his moral improprieties in sex and marriage) – so it is unclear to what extent this relationship is candidate-driven.

This study offers other takeaways for understanding relationships among age, alienation, and forms of civic participation. First, at least as of 2016, one should be careful about generalizing about young adults' political or even electoral participation based on voting rates. Younger adults were indeed substantially less likely than older adults to report having voted in 2016 – but voting was not used to define civic engagement profiles in this analysis. When it comes to the other forms of electoral participation queried by ANES, the playing field is even; there are no statistically significant differences in the likelihood of reporting each one using table 5's 3-category age group measure. Second, younger adults, as others have argued (Chou et al. 2017, Zukin et al. 2006) do indeed report a more diverse mix of civic activities than older adults do. But in a break with service substitution and other alternatives-to-politics narratives – and a

return to prior thinking -- these and elections-related activities appear to function more as complements. Third, service specialization is real and related to some forms of partisan alienation – but so too are the challenges of divining whether that service is functioning as an alternative to political engagement. Fortunately for fans of participatory democracy, this research suggests that service specialization is neither widespread, nor a preview of the United States' civic future.

Table 1. Items used to construct civic engagement profiles

Political Participation		Nonpolitical Participation
<i>Electoral</i>	<i>Expressive/Issue Advocacy</i>	
“We would like to find out about some of the things people do to help a party or a candidate win an election. During the campaign, did you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for or against one of the parties or candidates?” (48.8%)	Whether R contacted a government official, created from the following four items: “In the past twelve months, have you contacted a federal elected official, such as a member of Congress or the President, or someone on the staff of such an official? And what about a non-elected official in a federal government agency? Have you contacted such a person in the past twelve months? What about an elected official on the state or local level, such as a governor, mayor, or a member of the state legislature or city council, or someone on the staff of such an elected official? Have you contacted such a person in the past twelve months? And what about a non-elected official in a state or local government agency? Have you contacted such a person in the past twelve months? (23.3%)	“Many people say they have less time these days to do volunteer work. What about you, were you able to devote any time to volunteer work in the past 12 months or did you not do so?” (42.1%)
“Did you go to any political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners, or things like that in support of a particular candidate?” (7.2%)	“During the past 12 months, have you joined in a protest march, rally, or demonstration, or have you not done this in the past 12 months?” (3.4%)	“During the past 12 months, have you worked with other people to deal with some issue facing your community?” (31.7%)
“Did you wear a campaign button, put a campaign sticker on your car, or place a sign in your window or in front of your house?” (12.5%)	“During the past 12 months, have you signed a petition on the Internet or on paper about a political or social issue, or have you not done this in the past 12 months?” (23.9%)	“During the past 12 months, did you attend a meeting about an issue facing your local community or schools?” (28.8%)

“Did you do any (other) work for one of the parties or candidates?” (3.2%)	“During the past 12 months, have you ever posted a message on Facebook or Twitter about a political issue, or have you never done this in the past 12 months?” (33.7%)	
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Table 2. Sample Demographic and Political Characteristics by Civic Engagement Profile

	<i>Non-engaged</i>	<i>Service Specialists</i>	<i>Political Specialists</i>	<i>Dual Activists</i>
Strength of partisanship (1-4)	2.56	2.70	2.95	3.00
Perceived ideo. distance (0-6)	1.05	1.09	1.02	1.12
Major party disaffect (0-1)	0.43	0.36	0.26	0.24
Age	46.93	48.00	48.33	46.75
Female	0.51	0.57	0.49	0.53
Nonwhite	0.36	0.31	0.29	0.29
Educ. Attainment (1-5)	2.50	3.10	2.78	3.28
Income (1-28)	13.49	15.47	14.67	17.03
Weekly church attendee	0.14	0.28	0.11	0.23
Political interest	2.96	3.12	3.51	3.69
Political knowledge (0-3)	1.34	1.52	1.62	1.76
# service activities (of 3)	0.00	1.53	0.00	1.98
# political activities (of 8)	0.00	0.00	1.83	2.46
Voted in 2016	0.52	0.72	0.78	0.84
Registered to vote in 2016	0.72	0.88	0.91	0.95
Any consumer activism	0.36	0.47	0.54	0.69
Ever discuss politics	0.56	0.70	0.83	0.90
Days/past week discuss politics	2.71	3.13	4.04	4.40

Figures in table are means.

Table 3. Multinomial Logit Results

	<i>Non-engaged vs. Service Specialists</i>	<i>Political Specialists vs. Service Specialists</i>	<i>Dual Activists vs. Service Specialists</i>
Strength of partisanship	0.010 (0.091)	0.091 (0.077)	0.047 (0.073)
Perceived ideological distance from party	-0.063 (0.071)	-0.036 (0.070)	0.087 (0.066)
Major party disaffection	0.530+ (0.292)	-0.802** (0.303)	-1.083*** (0.274)
Age	0.003 (.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.017*** (0.004)
Female	-0.120 (0.158)	-0.122 (0.138)	0.086 (0.134)
Nonwhite	0.123 (0.196)	-0.139 (0.194)	-0.058 (0.159)
Education	-0.460*** (0.094)	-0.377*** (0.083)	-0.050 (0.079)
Income	-0.005 (0.012)	-0.009 (0.011)	0.012 (0.010)
Weekly church attendee	-0.843*** (0.216)	-1.326*** (0.191)	-0.276+ (0.159)
Political interest	-0.008 (0.083)	0.330*** (0.075)	0.461*** (0.068)
Political knowledge	-0.098 (0.092)	0.105 (0.086)	0.133 (0.084)
Constant	1.932*** (0.520)	1.539*** (0.459)	0.480 (0.438)

Notes. Figures in table are multinomial logit coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses.

+p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed). N = 3,934.

Table 4. Predictors of the Service-Politics Distribution of Dual Activists

	<i>Percentage of activities devoted to service (vs. politics)</i>
Strength of partisanship	-0.635 (0.601)
Perceived ideological distance from party	-0.839+ (0.456)
Major party disaffection	3.513+ (1.975)
Age	0.119*** (0.028)
Female	0.835 (0.754)
Nonwhite	1.920+ (0.990)
Education	0.201 (0.456)
Income	0.163** (0.066)
Weekly church attendee	5.362*** (1.008)
Political interest	-1.801*** (0.455)
Political knowledge	-0.853 (0.545)
Constant	45.326*** 3.105


Notes. Table shows ordinary least squares regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. +p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed), N=1,507, R²=.0748.

Table 5. Revised Civic Engagement Profile, by Age Group


	<25	25-64	>=65
Electorally engaged	0.550	0.524	0.569
Only expressively engaged	0.174	0.177	0.139
Service specialist	0.084	0.115	0.100
Not civically engaged	0.192	0.184	0.193

Notes. Figures in table are proportions. N=3,550. Weighted by standard ANES weights.
Chi2(6)=11.0 (p=.32).

Figure 1. Americans' Civic Engagement Profiles, 2016




Figures 2a-2d. Changes in Predicted Probability of Civic Engagement Profiles for Key Independent Variables



Figures show predicted probabilities of each civic engagement profile across values of key independent variables, with all other covariates set at their means. Predicted probabilities are based on the multinomial logit model reported in table 3.

Figure 3. Changes in Predicted Probability of Revised Civic Engagement Profile across Full Range of Key Independent Variable Values



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