

16. As a point of comparison, in 1948 there were 103 Democrats in southern seats and two Republicans.

17. This data file was assembled by Wright, Erikson, and McIver. It is a consolidation of the partisanship and ideology responses for respondents to the CBS News opinion polls over time. For the figure presented here, I simply took the average of the unweighted mean scores for the southern states on Republican and conservative identification. The minimum N for any given year was approximately 1,900. This version of the data file, covering the years 1976–2003, was available on Wright's home page (<http://mypage.iu.edu/~wright1/>).

18. The 2008 exit poll data used throughout this chapter are from the National Election Pool, conducted by Edison Media Research/Mitofsky International. The national results are used, as are each of the southern states. The 2004 exit-poll data used in Figure 2.5 come from the Edison Media Research/Mitofsky International data, collected for the national media pool.

19. The numbers reported throughout this chapter are based on published exit-poll results. I used the files available on www.msnbc.com, but the same results are available through numerous outlets.

20. Indeed, one of the early rounds of speculation in 2008 revolved around the possibility of Obama generating a massive wave of African American turnout, potentially flipping a southern state like Mississippi or Georgia.

21. On the topic of religious conservatives in American politics, see Lienesch (1993) and Wilcox (1996).

22. Other faiths, such as Jewish, Unitarian, and so forth, would be interesting to compare. However, the region is dominated by Protestant faiths. Surveys, even those as large as the national exit poll, do not collect enough responses for these smaller faiths to make analysis possible.

23. As a resident of Mississippi, I can offer a personal note of experience on how party and ideology may be used in the South for electoral purposes. Recent elections in my state have offered an endless stream of candidates enthusiastically proclaiming the breadth and depth of their conservatism (nobody runs as a moderate, much less a liberal). In contrast, the use of partisan labels is more uneven, with Republicans putting their partisan brand prominently in advertisements while Democrats simply never acknowledge anything other than the fact that they are a conservative candidate.

24. It is also possible that both campaigns worked to avoid race. The Republicans may have tried to avoid any allegation of racism, while the Democratic campaign may have wished to downplay race for fear of any backlash.

25. Note I am not arguing that there is some sort of a master strategy put together to somehow communicate subtle messages to conservative whites who may have some level of apprehension about race or policy related to race. Rather, I think it is likely that a range of Republican players, all acting with the same general outlook, can manage to send a range of signs that may be read favorably by someone uncomfortable with the idea of government-mandated equality. The effect may be to create a racially polarized vote without ever making a racial appeal.


The Transformation of Southern Presidential Primaries

Seth C. McKee and Danny Hayes

THE PREEMINENT ROLE OF PRIMARIES IN SELECTING PRESIDENTIAL nominees prompts us to consider their importance in the American South—a region undergoing the most partisan change since the end of World War II. Because the road to the White House for Democratic and Republican presidential aspirants means winning primaries, we contend primaries are the main vehicle for producing party-system change. In their capacity to decide which candidate represents the party in the general election, the substantially smaller subpopulations of voters who participate in primary contests have become presidential kingmakers.

Figure 3.1 documents the percentage of southern voters who took part in Republican primary contests in those election years when both parties had competitive nominations. For the first two contests following the end of World War II, presidential primaries were a rare and inconsequential mechanism of candidate selection. There were no Republican primaries in the South in 1948 and 1952, and the only Democratic primaries occurred in Alabama (1948) and Florida (1948 and 1952). By contrast, in more recent years, the number of southern presidential primaries has not only increased, but the *percentage* of southerners who voted in Republican contests also substantially increased. In 2000, for those southern states holding presidential primaries for both parties, 53 percent of voters participated in Republican contests. In 2008, the greater competitiveness and protracted contest between Democrats Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton attracted more southern voters to Democratic primaries (61 percent), but up through Super Tuesday (February 5, 2008), before it was apparent that John McCain would be the Republican nominee, more than 46 percent of southerners had voted in GOP races.

Figure 3.1 Percentage of Southern Voters Participating in Republican Presidential Primaries, Selected Years



Source: Data from 1948 to 2000 are from *Guide to U.S. Elections* (CQ Press 2005); 2008 data are from Michael P. McDonald, http://elections.gmu.edu/Voter_Turnout_2008_Primarys.htm.

Note: In 1948 and 1952, there were no Republican presidential primaries in the South. With the exception of 1948 and 1952, data exclude states that did not hold primaries for both parties in a given election year (in 1980 Arkansas [Democratic primary], Mississippi [Republican primary]; and South Carolina [Republican primary]; in 1988 South Carolina [Republican primary]; in 2000 South Carolina [Republican primary], and Virginia [Republican primary]).

In this chapter we assess the degree of stability and change in southern presidential primary electorates. We do this by examining several of the characteristics of southern primary voters based on the results of exit polls spanning the last seven elections (1984–2008). Not surprisingly, there is a substantial difference in the characteristics of Democratic versus Republican voters. What might be unexpected, though, is the extent to which the southern Republican primary electorate has stabilized, whereas the Democratic electorate continues to transform. As the most politically distinctive region and the one part of the United States where the term “realignment” is undisputed, the American South’s primary electorates reflect this substantial partisan change while simultaneously serving as a vehicle for fostering it.

The characteristics of the groups comprising the southern Democratic and Republican primary electorates have implications for the presidential nomination process. With respect to the ideological dimension, there is no longer a distinct regional flavor to voter preferences in the Democratic electorate because most conservatives now participate in Republican primaries. In addition, descriptive representation is elevated by the substantial minority presence in the Democratic electorate. Whereas the contemporary southern Democratic primary electorate now typically reflects the preferences of voters inside and outside the region, for the Republican Party successful campaigning in Dixie is critical. In a crowded 2008 field, the candidacy of Mike Huckabee demonstrated his regional appeal, whereby the party’s most conservative voters can still produce electoral outcomes that diverge from the national picture. The southern GOP primary electorate has hardened into a racially and ideologically homogeneous base of voters who routinely play a decisive role in picking their party’s presidential nominee.

Southern Presidential Primaries, 1948–2008

In this section we present a historical overview of southern presidential primaries since the end of World War II.¹ With the hegemony of the southern Democratic Party threatened from within in 1948 by the insurgent candidacy of Dixiecrat Strom Thurmond, Alabama and Florida were the only states that conducted primaries. The Alabama Democratic primary selected an anti-Truman slate of delegates, and the Florida primary delegates were unpledged. From 1952 through 1968, Florida was the only southern state to hold a Democratic presidential primary. Displaying the more conservative nature of southern Democrats, in three of these five primaries (1952, 1960, and 1968) Floridians preferred a candidate other than the eventual nominee.² On the Republican side, with the exception of Texas in 1964, from 1956 through 1968 Florida was again the only southern state holding primary contests. Except for the unpledged Florida delegates in 1964 and 1968, a majority of southern Republican primary voters backed their party’s nominee (Floridians for Eisenhower in 1956, Floridians for Nixon in 1960, Texans for Goldwater in 1964).

For a region that historically attached great significance to winning primaries below the national level, it was not until the 1970s that presidential primaries proved consequential in the South. Indeed, the one-party dominance of the Democratic Party from the end of Reconstruction in 1876 until the 1950s coined the popular truism that in southern politics winning the Democratic primary was tantamount to winning the election (Key 1949). But these were state and local primaries. Like the rest of the nation, it took the fracturing of the party at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in

Chicago—and the ensuing McGovern-Fraser Commission election reforms—for primaries to become the deciding factor in who wins presidential nominations. Since 1972, a majority of both party's delegates have been awarded through primary contests, the number of states holding primaries has markedly increased, and the frontloading of the nomination calendar has made it imperative for all serious contenders to run national campaigns.

In the 1970s, as primaries became the main vehicle for winning presidential nominations (Davis 1980), a handful of southern states adopted this mechanism for selecting candidates. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the growth in the number of presidential primaries held in each southern state from 1972 to 2008 for the Democratic and Republican parties, respectively. Because of the costs and coordination involved with administering primaries, in almost every state both parties' primaries are held on the same day. Also, the absence of a primary for one party is likely when that party controls the White House and the incumbent president runs for reelection (e.g., Florida did not conduct a Democratic presidential primary in 1996 when President Bill Clinton sought reelection). It is evident that the South, like the rest of the nation, prefers to conduct primaries to select presidential nominees. In 1972, only six out of a possible twenty-two presidential primaries were held in the South. By 2008, every southern state administered a presidential primary for selecting the Democratic and Republican nominees.

Table 3.1 The Growth of Southern Democratic Presidential Primaries, 1972–2008

1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008
	AR	AL	AL	AL	AL	AL	AL	AL	AL
FL	FL	AR	FL	AR	AR	AR	AR	AR	AR
	GA	FL	FL	FL	FL	FL	FL	FL	FL
		GA	GA	GA	GA	GA	GA	GA	GA
		LA	LA	LA	LA	LA	LA	LA	LA
				MS	MS	MS	MS	MS	MS
NC	NC	NC	NC	NC	NC	NC	NC	NC	NC
				SC	SC	SC	SC	SC	SC
TN	TN	<i>TN</i>	TN	TN	TN	TN	TN	<i>TN</i>	TN
		TX		TX	TX	TX	TX	TX	TX
				VA			VA	VA	VA
3	5	8	6	10	10	8	9	11	11

Sources: Primary data for 1972–2000 are from *Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections* (Congressional Quarterly 1994; Moore, Preimesberger, and Tarr 2001); data for 2004 are from the Federal Election Commission; data for 2008 are from the *New York Times* website.

Notes: All states shown held a presidential primary in that year; the total number of primaries for each year is displayed in the last row of the table. States in bold or italic held primaries on the same day for that specific year.

Table 3.2 The Growth of Southern Republican Presidential Primaries, 1972–2008

1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008
		AL		AL	AL	AL	AL	AL	AL
	AR			AR	AR	AR	AR	AR	AR
FL	FL	FL	FL	FL	FL	FL	FL	FL	FL
	GA	GA	GA	GA	GA	GA	GA	GA	GA
		LA	LA	LA	LA	LA	LA	LA	LA
		MS		MS	MS	MS	MS	MS	MS
NC	NC	NC		NC	NC	NC	NC	NC	NC
		SC		SC	SC	SC	SC	SC	SC
TN	TN	<i>TN</i>	TN	TN	TN	TN	TN	TN	TN
		TX	TX	TX	TX	TX	TX	TX	TX
				VA			VA	VA	VA
3	5	9	5	11	10	10	11	7	11

Sources: Primary data for 1972–2000 are from *Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections* (Congressional Quarterly 1994; Moore, Preimesberger, and Tarr 2001); data for 2004 are from the Federal Election Commission; data for 2008 are from the *New York Times* website.

Notes: All states shown held a presidential primary in that year; the total number of primaries for each year is displayed in the last row of the table. States in bold or italic held primaries on the same day for that specific year.

Only Florida, North Carolina, and Tennessee administered primaries in 1972. The distinctiveness of the South was evident in this election year. On the Democratic side, George Wallace won the most votes in each of these three southern states, exhibiting the regional appeal of a candidate who embraced policy positions that were anathema to the eventual Democratic nominee, George McGovern. McGovern was not even on the Democratic ballot in North Carolina. Not surprisingly, the Republican incumbent, Richard Nixon, had token opposition in these states' primary contests.

The 1976 election exhibited the significance of southern presidential primaries for both Democratic and Republican candidates. In a crowded Democratic field, Jimmy Carter received a considerable boost by sweeping the five southern state primaries. On the Republican side, these contests proved to be a strong indicator of Ronald Reagan's popularity in the South, as he conducted an insurgent candidacy against the incumbent, Gerald Ford. Out of the five southern state primaries, Ronald Reagan won three (winning in Arkansas, Georgia, and North Carolina and losing to Ford in Florida and Tennessee). In 1980, Reagan swept the nine southern state primaries—winning a majority of the vote in every contest, including Texas (51 percent of the vote), where George H. W. Bush was the presumptive favorite son. The year 1980 was the first to witness concerted efforts in the region to coordinate primary dates. President Jimmy Carter was a strong advocate of regional coordination given his relative strength in the South and his intra-

party fight with Senator Edward M. Kennedy, who was expected to run strong in New Hampshire (Stanley and Hadley 1987). Carter swept all eight southern primaries and was the beneficiary of the smaller southeastern primary held by Alabama, Florida, and Georgia on March 11.

The southeastern primary, first administered in 1980, became the precursor to the southern region's Super Tuesday. In 1984, on the Democratic side, Alabama, Florida, and Georgia once again held primaries on the same day (March 13). The year 1984 was the first year for which we have a series of state-level primary exit-poll data; as we will demonstrate, the southern Democratic primary electorate was in the middle of a transformation. The change taking place on the Democratic side is evident in the mixed electoral outcomes in 1984 and in the first Super Tuesday in 1988. In 1984, for the six southern states holding Democratic primaries, Walter Mondale won four (Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, and Tennessee), Gary Hart won Florida, and Jesse Jackson won Louisiana.

Much has been written about the first Super Tuesday, held on March 8, 1988 (see Black and Black 1992; Hadley and Stanley 1989, 1996; Norrander 1991, 1992; Rae 1994). The Democratic elites who devised Super Tuesday through the Southern Legislative Conference (Hadley and Stanley 1989) intended it to serve as a regional firewall capable of blocking the nomination of a liberal candidate such as Walter Mondale (Lublin 2004). In this regard, the initial Super Tuesday was an abject failure, with southern Democratic primary voters splintering in favor of three different candidates: Michael Dukakis, Al Gore, and Jesse Jackson. Dukakis won Florida and Texas, which is, perhaps, fitting, as culturally these are the least-southern of the southern states. Gore won Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee. Jackson, displaying his descriptive appeal among the large percentage of African American voters, won the Deep South states of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi; he also placed first in Virginia.³

It is evident that Super Tuesday 1988 did not deliver on presenting a united front to promote the selection of a centrist Democratic nominee because the southern Democratic electorate was such a diverse coalition of voters (Black and Black 1992; Norrander 1992). The presence of several different types of candidates led to a divided vote, with each candidate drawing support among those voters most descriptively similar to them (Norrander 1991, 87). On the Republican side, by contrast, the story was very different as southern Republican voters united behind the candidacy of Reagan's heir-apparent Vice President George H. W. Bush. Bush swept the southern Super Tuesday states and the entire South (he won South Carolina, which held its primary on March 5; Hadley and Stanley 1989).

In 1992, however, Super Tuesday proved ideal for electing a moderate native son of the South as Bill Clinton won a majority of the vote in all ten southern states holding Democratic primaries. Only five southern states

participated in Super Tuesday 1992; a number of southern states, disappointed by a lack of southern unity in Super Tuesday 1988 and feeling slighted by the candidates, opted to hold primaries on dates other than March 10 (Hadley and Stanley 1996; Bullock 1994). As expected, President Bush breezed through the southern Republican primary contests in 1992, just as Clinton did in 1996—with both incumbents winning a majority of their party's votes in every southern state primary in their reelection bids. With the exception of John McCain's strong showing in South Carolina, the first southern state to hold a Republican primary in 2000 (February 19), the Democratic and Republican establishment candidacies of Al Gore and George W. Bush proved equally popular in party primaries in their native regions.

The 2004 Democratic primary may have marked a turning point. There is evidence to suggest that the southern Democratic primary electorate had finally completed its transformation into a nationally representative population of Democratic voters. In the southern primaries, with the leading contenders hailing from New England (John Kerry) and the South (John Edwards), the northern candidate bested the southerner in all but one contest—South Carolina, the native state of John Edwards. By the 2004 nomination season, those moderate-to-conservative voters who may have boosted Edwards's bid in the South were long gone, opting instead to participate overwhelmingly in Republican primaries.

Whereas 2004 signaled the nationalization of the southern Democratic primary electorate, 2008 revealed the distinctiveness of southern Republican primary voters. In the absence of a viable Republican candidate displaying consistent conservative views across policy domains (i.e., an economic, social, and foreign policy conservative),⁴ southern Republican primary voters revealed a lack of unity reminiscent of the sort displayed by southern Democratic primary voters in 1988. In 2008, without a consistent conservative candidate, southern Republican primary voters apparently divided their votes on the basis of viability (John McCain) and regional affinity (Mike Huckabee). To be sure, John McCain benefited enormously in the first southern primary, held in South Carolina on January 19, 2008. Fred Thompson made his final stand in South Carolina, where he and Mike Huckabee, the two native southerners, combined for 45.4 percent of the vote,⁵ leaving John McCain as the plurality winner with 33.2 percent. McCain's win in South Carolina positioned him to win the next contest, held in Florida on January 29. McCain's victory in the Sunshine State solidified his nomination, even though later he traded victories across the South with Huckabee.⁶

With regard to the southern Democratic primary contests in the South in 2008, there are three things worth noting: (1) Barack Obama was the prohibitive favorite among African American voters, who clearly demonstrated

their desire for descriptive representation; (2) Hillary Clinton displayed descriptive appeal among white women, and subregional strength, as she won her former home state of Arkansas, neighboring Tennessee, and Florida—states that President Clinton carried in the 1996 general elections; and (3) the only truly southern candidate, John Edwards, proved unpalatable to a southern electorate that no longer had a penchant for electing a son of the South who was no longer representative of the typical southern Democratic primary voter.

Presidential Primaries and Party-System Change

So what does all this chronicling of southern primary election outcomes mean with respect to political change in a region that continues to experience partisan transformation? In this section, we offer a theoretical argument for the role that primaries play in contributing to party-system change. Adopting key components of the issue-evolution theory of partisan change (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Stimson 2004), we contend that presidential primaries are the main vehicles for transforming the electorates that support the major parties in presidential elections. Because of their decisive role in selecting presidential nominees, primary voters determine their party's national brand of candidate. It is through the primary that the kinds of candidates acceptable to the rank-and-file voter are decided.

Consider a point in time when both parties are in equilibrium. For instance, in the South, prior to the civil rights issue coming to the fore, the Democratic Party was dominant. And although everywhere it was seen as a whites-only party, the Democratic Party exhibited substantial ideological diversity if merely for the fact that the GOP was a nominal party in most parts of the region—especially with respect to presidential contests (Key 1949). Top-down advancement is a powerful direction for political change (Aistrup 1996) because of the central role that elites play in either preventing or initiating political change. It takes the introduction of an “easy issue” (Carmines and Stimson 1980)—one that is understood by the entire electorate and highly salient as well as cross-cutting (see Sundquist 1983)—to implement a partisan electoral realignment.

The high profile of presidential candidates allows them to have the greatest influence in steering the direction of their parties-in-the-electorate (that is, that part of the structure consisting of voters who identify with a particular party). Therefore, the introduction of a new issue receives the greatest attention if it is addressed by presidential nominees. First, each party's presidential nominee must take an opposing position on the issue. Second, for the new issue to divide the political parties along a new dimension, it must cut across existing voter loyalties. For example, for the civil

rights issue to disrupt the status quo of party supporters, it must draw support among a subset of Democrats and Republicans who are willing to shift political allegiances on the basis of this issue. Among those who find the issue important enough, some Democrats who strongly oppose the active enforcement of civil rights protections for African Americans will leave the party and vote in favor of Republican candidates who oppose the civil rights agenda. Likewise, those Republicans who are supportive of civil rights will leave their party in support of Democratic candidates who advocate civil rights. The 1964 presidential election provided the critical moment for this kind of scenario to play out, with perhaps one modification to the theoretical argument—there were hardly any Republicans in the South; thus Goldwater's opposition to the 1964 Civil Rights Act served as a launching pad for building the Republican Party, especially with support from disaffected conservative southern Democrats (Aistrup 1996).

What enables an issue like civil rights to transform the group bases of support for the Democratic and Republican parties is the presence of *path dependency*. Once the initial cleavage on the race issue is established and a new political alignment emerges, the new political alignment must be reinforced by a steady stream of presidential candidates who embrace the new position that their party has taken on the issue. This is exactly what happened in the presidential elections from 1964 forward. With the initial stand taken on civil rights in the 1964 election, every subsequent Democratic and Republican presidential nominee has differed on the issue in a consistent manner: Democratic nominees have embraced the civil rights issue, whereas Republican nominees, if not openly hostile to civil rights, have made it apparent that it is not a cause they seek to advance. Thus, in keeping with an issue-evolution explanation of partisan change, the introduction of a new issue must upset the equilibrium of the party's primary electorates, causing the entrance and exit of voters across party lines on the basis of this cross-cutting cleavage. With the changing composition of each party's primary electorate set in motion by the advent of the controversial issue, it is in these contests where “voters then begin to enforce issue discipline on politicians” (Stimson 2004, 67).

On important issues that have come to distinguish the major parties through issue evolution, party nominees essentially must pass a litmus test. This was evident in the issue evolution of civil rights and, more recently, with respect to abortion (Adams 1997). Presidential aspirants who harbor any hope of becoming the Democratic nominee must favor a woman's right to choose. Likewise, a Republican candidate must be pro-life to successfully run the primary gauntlet. The clearest evidence for this requirement is those instances where presidential candidates switched their positions on the abortion issue so that it agreed with the majority position of the primary electorate prior to seeking their party's presidential nomination (Democrats

include Dick Gephardt and Al Gore; Republicans include George H. W. Bush and Mitt Romney).

The process of issue evolution is a compelling way to explain the transformation of primary electorates. Although elites behave in an entrepreneurial fashion by introducing issues that have the potential to differentiate themselves from a crowded primary field, it is how voters react to these issue positions that determines whether a new political course is embraced. Primary voters are the gatekeepers to presidential nominations, but the characteristics of each party's primary electorate remain stable only in the absence of issue evolution. Once issue evolution is set in motion, it will alter the composition of the social groups composing each party's primary electorate as voters resort themselves into the partisan camp that best reflects their political beliefs (Fiorina et al. 2005). It naturally follows that because primary contests are the mechanism for selecting presidential nominees, primary voters instill issue discipline on their nominees but are also influenced by the positions of candidates who successfully advocate a new direction and thus transform the primary electorate so that it reflects the preferences of party nominees. We show evidence of this transformative process by documenting the changing characteristics of southern Democratic and Republican primary voters.

Data

We use exit-poll data from presidential elections (1984–2008) to explore changes in the composition of the primary electorates in the South. We focus on three states for which data are available in at least five election cycles: Georgia, Tennessee, and Texas.⁷ Although not representative of the South as a whole, the states vary in characteristics that we think are conceptually important to examining political change. Georgia is a traditional Deep South state with a large African American population.⁸ Tennessee is a Rim South state on the geographical periphery with a larger proportion of white voters. And Texas is a southern “mega state” (Black and Black 2002) that has seen rapid growth especially since 1980, particularly with the expansion of the Hispanic population.⁹ So even though we make no claims that the patterns in each state are predictive of the entire South, their diversity should illuminate the developments that have occurred in states with differing characteristics.

We use exit-poll data from surveys conducted by CBS News/New York Times (1984–1988), Voter News Service (1992–2000), and the National Election Pool (2004–2008). Exit polls in the Republican and Democratic primaries were conducted in 1988, 1992, 2000, and 2008. In 1984 and 2004, Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush faced no opposition in their reelection

bids, and in 1996 Democratic incumbent Bill Clinton did not have a serious primary challenger. As a result, in 1984 and 2004 only Democratic primary voters were surveyed, and in 1996 only Republican primary voters were interviewed. In three elections, we also augment these data with polling data from Super Tuesday exit polls conducted in the Democratic (1988 and 2000) and Republican (1988, 1996, and 2000) primaries. In each year, a sample of voters from multiple southern states were interviewed, allowing us to determine whether the patterns we observe in Georgia, Tennessee, and Texas are replicated among voters in a larger set of southern states. The results are not representative of any single state but are designed to capture the attitudes and characteristics of voters in the region as a whole.


In the analysis that follows, we examine the composition of the Democratic and Republican primary electorates in terms of ideology, race, sex, party identification, and age. For clarity and aesthetics, we present graphically only a select portion of the data, but comprehensive tables are displayed in the appendix to this chapter.

Results: The Democratic Primary Electorate

The most striking change in the Democratic primary electorate since 1984 has been its leftward shift. Figure 3.2 plots the percentage of Democratic voters in Georgia, Tennessee, and Texas who identified as liberal, moderate, and conservative. In every case, the proportion of liberals in the electorate has increased while the percentage of moderates and conservatives has fallen slightly. Despite the geographic and cultural variation in these three states, all have seen nearly identical changes in their Democratic electorates.

The ideological shift has been most pronounced in Georgia. In 1984, just 22 percent of Democratic voters called themselves liberals. But by 2008, liberals constituted a near majority, with 47 percent. The shifts were somewhat smaller in Tennessee (23 percent to 41 percent) and Texas (29 percent to 45 percent in 2004), but the patterns are the same. As the national Democratic Party has moved left, so has its southern party-in-the-electorate. Data from surveys of southern Super Tuesday voters (not shown) provide additional evidence of the shift: In 1988, liberals represented 29 percent of southern Democratic voters and 42 percent in 2000. An ideological realignment among voters (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998) has likely brought about some of the change. But the evolution is also due to the changing racial composition of the Democratic Party in the South. It is well documented that white voters in the South have increasingly shifted to the GOP (Black and Black 2002; Hayes and McKee 2008) in recent decades. As whites have shifted their party allegiance, the Democratic primary electorate has become increasingly

Figure 3.2 Ideology in Southern Democratic Primaries, 1984–2008



diverse. Because minorities tend to be more liberal than whites, part of the liberalization of the Democratic Party has likely come from its growing racial heterogeneity.

Figure 3.3 displays the percentage of white, black, and Hispanic voters in the Democratic primary. (Percentages for all racial categories are shown in the appendix to this chapter.) In each state, the white proportion of the Democratic electorate has declined since 1984. In Georgia and Tennessee, this has led to an increase in the proportion of African American voters. In Texas, Hispanics have increased their share of the electorate, such that in 2008 they made up 32 percent of Democratic primary voters. The political importance of Hispanics in Texas was evident in 2008, as the Clinton and Obama campaigns sought to win the allegiance of this fast-growing group in the state's Democratic coalition (e.g., Traub 2008).¹⁰

The evolving racial composition of the party is less apparent among Super Tuesday states, due in part to the fact that the most recent data point is 2000. As shown in Figure 3.3, the diversification of the Democratic electorate has proceeded apace in the two most recent elections. But the Super Tuesday data also underscore that states like Georgia and Texas have seen greater diversification since 1984 than other southern states, such as Tennessee.

The exit polling also reveals the persistence of a gender gap in southern politics. At the national level, women are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party and to vote for Democratic presidential candidates than are men (e.g., Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999). Figure 3.4, which presents the proportion of the Democratic electorate made up of men and women, shows that the gender gap has become more pronounced since the 1980s. In both Georgia and Tennessee, women have represented an increasingly large share of the Democratic electorate. In 2008, 63 percent of voters were women in Georgia; that number was 59 percent in Tennessee and 57 percent in Texas. The 2008 numbers reflect enthusiasm among women for Hillary Clinton's candidacy and what appears to be a growing gender gap in parts of the South (see Black 2004). Texas has seen much less change, but across the South the percentage of women in 2000 was larger than in 1988.

The Democratic electorate has seen change along several other dimensions, though the shifts are much less pronounced. For example, the percentage of voters identifying their religious affiliation as Protestant has declined substantially since 1984, as more voters have begun identifying themselves with other Christian denominations (see the chapter appendix). But the most fundamental and politically relevant shifts are those associated with race and ideology. As the Democratic electorate in the South has become more diverse, it has also become more liberal, a change that has suggested a growing congruence between the Democratic Party in the South and in the nation as a whole.

Figure 3.3 Race in Southern Democratic Primaries, 1984–2008





Figure 3.4 Gender in Southern Democratic Primaries, 1984–2008



Results: The Republican Primary Electorate

The story on the Republican side since the 1980s, however, is one of stability, with much less dramatic change. This is not to say that the GOP in the South has not undergone a transformation. Conservative southerners throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and especially in the early 1980s moved into the Republican Party as the GOP took positions that fit with their values and beliefs. Indeed, in *general* presidential elections the increase in the Republican identification of conservative white southerners was remarkable from 1980 to 1988, going from 40 percent to 60 percent in the span of eight years (Black and Black 2002, 222). This rapid increase in Republican identification among white conservatives has been described as the “Reagan realignment” (Black and Black 2002, especially ch. 7).

Nonetheless, given our reliance on post-1980 *primary* exit-poll data, much of the transformation of the Republican Party had taken place prior to the time frame we are analyzing. In fact, what is most striking about the southern Republican primary electorate is not the characteristics of its voters but rather its increase in size even as the GOP gradually increased its electoral advantage across the South since the 1960s (Black and Black 2002; Hayes and McKee 2008; Hood et al. 2004). Thus, the greater GOP stability, compared to the Democratic Party, reflects the fact that major compositional shifts in the GOP electorate took place before exit-poll data were widely available.

Still, Figure 3.5 shows that the consolidation of the southern GOP as a conservative party has continued into the first elections of the twenty-first century. For example, the percentage of Georgia Republican primary voters identifying themselves as conservatives increased to 67 percent in 2008 from 61 percent in 2000, the party’s last contested Republican primary. In Tennessee, conservatives in 2008 made up three-quarters of primary voters, the largest proportion in our time frame. Likewise, in Texas the peak for conservatives comes in 2008, with 72 percent of Republican primary voters classifying themselves as conservatives.

As the GOP electorate has grown somewhat more conservative in recent elections, it has also become more heavily Republican. (Figure 3.6). This is a relevant development, because primaries in the three states are open, meaning that voters can cast ballots in either party’s primary. Thus, changes in the partisan composition of the primary electorate can tell us the extent to which the contests are increasingly coming to be populated by party regulars, as opposed to independents or members of the other party.

Finally, another indicator of the GOP’s growing solidity in the South is the change in the age distribution of voters. In the early 1980s, the most-Republican age cohort in the region was 18- to 29-year-olds (Hayes and McKee 2008). But as is evident in Figure 3.7, the Republican primary electorate has matured since 1988, with a growing share of its primary elec-

Figure 3.5 Ideology in Southern Republican Primaries, 1988–2008




Figure 3.6 Party Identification in Southern Republican Primaries, 1988–2008





Figure 3.7 Age Distribution Among Southern Republican Primary Voters, 1988–2000



torate being represented by middle-aged and older voters. In 1988, voters over the age of 45 made up 55 percent of the GOP primary electorate. In 1996, that figure was 63 percent, and by 2000 it was 74 percent. The data from the three states (see the chapter appendix) confirm that the pattern in Figure 3.6 has continued since 2000; older voters in 2004 and 2008 grew in importance in GOP primaries.

On other dimensions, the GOP has seen some change, such as a growing percentage of the electorate identifying as other Christian, which also occurred in the Democratic Party. But the three characteristics displayed in Figures 3.5 through 3.7—ideology, party identification, and age—represent the most significant changes in the GOP electorate since 1988.

The Democratic and Republican Primary Electorates in 2008

In this section, we compare the Democratic and Republican primary voters in 2008 on several selected characteristics. With the ongoing transformation of the Democratic primary electorate and the solidification of the Republican electorate, the disparity in the political and demographic charac-

teristics of these southern voters will continue to grow. Table 3.3 presents data on southern Democratic and Republican presidential primary voters in the 2008 contests. Among the characteristics discussed in the previous two sections, we have purposely selected features that indicate the greatest differences among Democratic and Republican southern primary voters: ideology (conservatives and liberals), race/ethnicity (African American and Hispanic), gender (female), religion (Protestant), and family income (those making over \$100,000). Data for every southern state but North Carolina (no Republican primary exit poll) are included in the table.

In Table 3.3, we see that the largest differences between each southern state's Democratic and Republican primary electorates concern ideology and race. In every state, at least six out of ten Republican primary voters are conservative, whereas only three states have Democratic primary voters with more than one out of five who consider themselves conservative (Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas). The differences are not as stark with respect to Democratic and Republican primary voters who classify themselves as liberal, because such a large portion of Democratic primary voters consider themselves to be moderates (percentages not shown). Nevertheless, the percentage of Democratic primary voters who are liberals is substantial in most states, but it is minuscule in the case of Republican primary voters, with 11 percent liberal Republican primary voters in Florida constituting the largest share.

With the exception of Texas, where the percentage of Hispanic primary voters is considerable and the Democratic primary advantage is great, the size of the southern Hispanic electorate is modest and interparty differences are negligible. Not surprisingly, the marked interparty racial differences are reflected in the composition of African American voters. With the exception of Louisiana (48 percent African American), in all the Deep South states the Democratic primary electorates are at least 50 percent African American. We expect this racial disparity to continue to grow if only because the southern Republican Party has shown hardly any interest in courting African Americans.

The historic candidacy of Democrat Hillary Clinton undoubtedly had an effect on altering the gender composition of the southern Democratic and Republican primary electorates. However, it is also evident from the results presented in the previous two sections that the gender gap in southern presidential primary electorates is not entirely election- or candidate-specific—it has been present for some time, and Hillary Clinton's campaign certainly contributed to it. Only in Texas do we find a gender gap under double digits. In every state, women comfortably outnumber their male counterparts in Democratic primary voting. Although the margins are not as great, every state's Republican primary electorate is majority-male.

Perhaps an underappreciated difference among southern Democratic

Table 3.3: Differences Between Southern Presidential Primary Voters in the 2008 Democratic and Republican Contests

Characteristics	AL	AR	FL	GA	LA	MS	SC	TN	TX	VA
Conservatives (%)										
Dem voters	17	15	13	12	21	24	15	17	22	12
Rep voters	72	67	61	67	71	63	69	73	72	65
Difference	-55	-52	-48	-55	-50	-39	-54	-56	-50	-53
Liberals (%)										
Dem voters	38	36	51	47	31	36	44	41	38	50
Rep voters	7	7	11	9	9	10	7	7	8	8
Difference	+31	+29	+40	+38	+22	+26	+37	+34	+30	+42
African American (%)										
Dem voters	51	17	19	51	48	50	55	29	19	30
Rep voters	4	2	3	2	4	1	2	2	2	3
Difference	+47	+15	+16	+49	+44	+49	+53	+27	+17	+27
Hispanic (%)										
Dem voters	4	2	12	3	4	0	1	3	32	5
Rep voters	2	2	12	2	5	0	1	3	10	2
Difference	+2	0	0	+1	-1	0	0	0	+22	+3
Female (%)										
Dem voters	60	60	59	63	60	58	61	59	57	57
Rep voters	47	49	44	48	49	47	49	47	49	47
Difference	+13	+11	+15	+15	+11	+11	+12	+12	+8	+10
Protestant (%)										
Dem voters	76	77	49	67	53	76	—	75	49	57
Rep voters	91	89	60	81	62	85	82	87	76	74
Difference	-15	-12	-11	-14	-9	-9	NA	-12	-27	-17
Income > \$100K (%)										
Dem voters	14	15	22	27	13	10	15	13	25	39
Rep voters	18	24	31	37	27	19	28	24	36	42
Difference	-4	-9	-9	-10	-14	-9	-13	-11	-11	-3

Source: Data are from exit poll results from www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/primaries/.

Notes: The South Carolina Democratic primary survey did not ask respondents to select their religious preference. North Carolina is excluded from the table because there was no survey conducted for Republican primary voters.

and Republican primary voters concerns religious preference. With the influx of Hispanics, some parts of the South have experienced a significant increase in the portion of Catholics. Overall, though, in a region that has historically been dominated by Protestantism, we see the relative secularization of the Democratic primary electorate vis-à-vis Republican primary voters. In every state, for example, Republican primary voters are decidedly more Protestant. Small increases in Catholic identification among Democrats have not offset the decline in Protestant identification. The Republican Party's conservative stance on a host of social issues (e.g., abortion, school prayer, and gay marriage) melds seamlessly with the religious sentiments of the vast majority of Republican primary voters.

Lastly, as others have noted (see Nadeau et al. 2004; Stonecash et al.

2003), partisan polarization in the South is partly attributable to class differences. At least since the economic appeals of Dwight Eisenhower in the 1950s, the GOP has made inroads among southerners by advocating conservative economic principles (Shafer and Johnston 2006). Although the differences are not large in Alabama and Virginia, in every southern state the Republican primary electorate is more affluent. To summarize: The significant differences between Democratic and Republican primary voters across a range of characteristics makes it clear that the positions of current and future presidential party nominees will continue to diverge.

Conclusion

Given their importance in selecting party nominees, it is somewhat curious that hardly any scholarship, despite the substantial coverage of general presidential elections in the South (for a review of this literature see Stanley 2006), focuses on examining southern presidential primaries (but see Black and Black 1992). In this chapter, we have documented and analyzed change and stability in the composition of southern Democratic and Republican primary electorates and emphasized their importance in shaping presidential politics.

The tremendous partisan change that has occurred in the South since 1948 is manifested in the composition of the region's presidential primary electorates. The southern Democratic and Republican primary electorates are markedly different on a host of characteristics, and these differences have sharpened as Democratic primary voters increasingly exhibit characteristics that distinguish them from their Republican counterparts. The contemporary Democratic primary electorate is ideologically moderate to liberal, racially and religiously diverse, majority-female, and toward the lower end of the socioeconomic scale. The Republican primary electorate is decidedly conservative, overwhelmingly white, majority Protestant, majority male, and middle to upper class. It would be hyperbole to say that the typical southern Democratic and Republican primary voters are polar opposites, but they differ enough to make it apparent to even the most casual political observer why the South exhibits such clear distinctions in its partisan politics.

Appendix

Table 3.A1 Characteristics of the Georgia Republican Primary Electorate, 1988–2008

	1988	1992	1996	2000	2008
Ideology					
Liberal	5	9	9	10	9
Moderate	32	30	29	29	25
Conservative	63	61	62	61	67
Age					
18–29	16	12	12	10	11
30–44	36	31	33	31	28
45–59	20	29	30	35	34
60+	26	28	25	25	26
Sex					
Male	50	53	52	51	52
Female	49	47	48	49	48
Race					
White	97	96	—	—	94
Black	2	3	—	—	2
Hispanic	<1	<1	—	—	2
Asian	—	—	—	—	1
Other	<1	<1	—	—	1
PID					
Democrat	11	9	11	9	4
Republican	59	59	62	62	77
Independent/Other	31	32	28	29	18
Education					
No high school diploma	6	6	4	3	2
High school graduate	23	23	20	19	18
Some college	30	28	29	32	28
College graduate	22	24	26	27	30
Postgraduate degree	20	18	20	19	21
Income^a					
<\$15,000	6	8	6	3	3
\$15,000–\$29,999	17	19	16	10	7
\$30,000–\$49,999	21	31	26	25	15
\$50,000–\$74,999	26	27	27	27	20
\$75,000–\$100,000	29	15	12	18	18
\$100,000+	—	—	13	18	37
Religion					
Protestant	70	69	63	61	56
Catholic	10	8	12	13	11
Other Christian	12	15	17	18	25
Jewish	1	1	2	2	2
Something else	3	4	3	3	2
None	4	3	4	3	3

Notes: a. The displayed categories reflect those used in the 1996 and 2000 surveys. In 1988, the income categories were <\$12,500, \$12,500–\$24,999, \$25,000–\$34,999, \$35,000–\$49,999, and \$50,000+. In 1992, the top category represented \$75,000+. Total N of respondents in each survey: 1988=975; 1992=1,445; 1996=1,929; 2000=1,263; 2008=974.

Table 3.A2. Characteristics of the Georgia Democratic Primary Electorate, 1984-2008

	1984	1988	1992	2000	2004	2008
Ideology						
Liberal	22	26	29	43	37	47
Moderate	46	46	44	45	40	41
Conservative	31	27	27	12	23	12
Age						
18-29	14	16	15	12	11	18
30-44	32	34	35	31	24	29
45-59	24	24	24	31	46	34
60+	30	24	27	27	19	19
Sex						
Male	45	48	46	41	44	37
Female	55	52	54	59	56	63
Race						
White	70	63	70	57	49	43
Black	28	35	29	40	46	51
Hispanic	<1	<1	<1	1	3	3
Asian	—	—	<1	1	1	1
Other	1	<1	<1	1	1	2
PID						
Democrat	68	76	66	81	70	77
Republican	7	5	5	2	10	4
Independent/Other	25	19	28	17	19	19
Education						
No high school diploma	18	10	10	8	6	4
High school graduate	34	30	27	23	20	13
Some college	23	25	24	28	30	31
College graduate	25	17	20	23	24	24
Postgraduate degree	—	18	20	18	19	28
Income ^a						
<\$15,000	26	14	18	6	11	6
\$15,000-\$29,999	28	23	26	18	16	11
\$30,000-\$49,999	20	23	19	29	24	21
\$50,000-\$74,999	16	21	17	27	23	20
\$75,000-\$100,000	9	19	10	13	12	14
\$100,000+	—	—	—	9	13	27
Religion						
Protestant	—	59	54	43	42	28
Catholic	—	7	7	11	7	9
Other Christian	—	19	24	29	30	40
Jewish	—	2	2	3	1	3
Something else	—	8	9	10	13	10
None	—	4	5	5	7	11

Notes: a. The displayed categories reflect those used in the 2000 and 2004 surveys. In 1984 and 1988, the income categories were <\$12,500, \$12,500-\$24,999, \$25,000-\$34,999, \$35,000-\$49,999, and \$50,000+. In 1992, the top category represented \$75,000+. Total N of respondents in each survey: 1984=1,274; 1988=1,323; 1992=1,516; 2000=777; 2004=1,687; 2008=1,097.

Table 3.A3. Characteristics of the Tennessee Republican Primary Electorate, 1988-2008

	1988	1992	1996	2000	2008
Ideology					
Liberal	8	7	8	9	7
Moderate	30	34	28	27	20
Conservative	61	58	65	65	73
Age					
18-29	13	11	13	8	11
30-44	30	30	32	25	29
45-59	30	29	28	35	29
60+	24	30	28	33	31
Sex					
Male	52	56	55	52	53
Female	48	44	45	48	47
Race					
White	97	99	—	—	94
Black	2	1	—	—	2
Hispanic	1	<1	—	—	3
Asian	—	<1	—	—	1
Other	—	<1	—	—	1
PID					
Democrat	6	3	6	3	4
Republican	70	69	71	74	73
Independent/Other	24	27	23	23	22
Education					
No high school diploma	10	6	6	—	4
High school graduate	26	24	23	—	20
Some college	25	27	29	—	33
College graduate	25	25	26	—	25
Postgraduate degree	14	18	16	—	18
Income ^a					
<\$15,000	8	9	8	9	5
\$15,000-\$29,999	20	23	17	19	11
\$30,000-\$49,999	19	26	30	25	19
\$50,000-\$74,999	23	23	26	22	26
\$75,000-\$99,999	31	19	12	13	16
\$100,000+	—	—	8	13	23
Religion					
Protestant	73	73	65	68	61
Catholic	8	6	7	6	6
Other Christian	13	13	21	19	26
Jewish	2	1	1	<1	<1
Something else	2	3	4	4	4
None	2	4	2	3	2

Notes: a. The displayed categories reflect those used in the 1996 and 2000 surveys. In 1988, the income categories were <\$12,500, \$12,500-\$24,999, \$25,000-\$34,999, \$35,000-\$49,999, and \$50,000+. In 1992, the top category represented \$75,000+. Total N of respondents in each survey: 1988=465; 1992=892; 1996=2,002; 2000=721; 2008=1,189.

Table 3.A4 Characteristics of the Tennessee Democratic Primary Electorate, 1984-2008

	1984	1988	1992	2000	2004	2008
Ideology						
Liberal	23	24	22	31	38	41
Moderate	55	43	49	45	45	43
Conservative	22	34	29	24	18	17
Age						
18-29	16	16	9	7	7	13
30-44	29	31	32	22	22	26
45-59	24	23	30	33	48	33
60+	31	29	29	38	23	28
Sex						
Male	47	47	52	47	46	41
Female	53	53	48	53	54	59
Race						
White	72	72	86	69	74	67
Black	27	27	13	28	24	29
Hispanic	<1	<1	<1	2	1	3
Asian	—	—	1	<1	<1	1
Other	1	<1	<1	<1	1	1
PID						
Democrat	79	72	67	78	74	76
Republican	4	7	5	4	6	3
Independent/Other	17	21	28	18	20	20
Education						
No high school diploma	22	15	15	—	7	7
High school graduate	33	30	35	—	27	27
Some college	24	22	22	—	29	32
College graduate	21	14	13	—	19	22
Postgraduate degree	—	18	15	—	18	13
Income ^a						
<\$15,000	31	19	22	12	9	9
\$15,000-\$29,999	30	28	30	20	18	17
\$30,000-\$49,999	23	17	26	33	26	27
\$50,000-\$74,999	13	22	15	21	25	21
\$75,000-\$99,999	4	14	7	7	11	13
\$100,000+	—	—	—	6	10	14
Religion						
Protestant	—	60	65	59	52	35
Catholic	—	7	4	4	7	7
Other Christian	—	17	19	28	23	40
Jewish	—	2	1	<1	1	1
Something else	—	10	7	5	10	10
None	—	4	4	3	7	7

Notes: a. The displayed categories reflect those used in the 2000 and 2004 surveys. In 1984 and 1988, the income categories were <\$12,500, \$12,500-\$24,999, \$25,000-\$34,999, \$35,000-\$49,999, and \$50,000+. In 1992, the top category represented \$75,000+. Total N of respondents in each survey: 1984=1,495; 1988=440; 1992=1,019; 2000=717; 2004=2,592; 2008=1,345.

Table 3.A5 Characteristics of the Texas Republican Primary Electorate, 1988-2000

	1988	1992	1996	2000	2008
Ideology					
Liberal	7	8	6	9	8
Moderate	33	31	26	28	20
Conservative	61	60	68	63	72
Age					
18-29	18	14	10	10	13
30-44	34	32	30	27	23
45-59	24	25	31	32	33
60+	23	29	29	31	31
Sex					
Male	52	52	52	52	51
Female	48	48	48	48	49
Race					
White	93	94	—	—	87
Black	3	1	—	—	2
Hispanic	3	3	—	—	10
Asian	—	1	—	—	1
Other	1	1	—	—	1
PID					
Democrat	4	3	4	4	2
Republican	69	68	70	75	78
Independent/Other	27	29	26	21	21
Education					
No high school diploma	5	3	2	—	2
High school graduate	20	18	18	—	14
Some college	35	33	31	—	35
College graduate	23	25	29	—	33
Postgraduate degree	18	20	21	—	16
Income ^a					
<\$15,000	5	7	6	3	3
\$15,000-\$29,999	17	24	15	11	7
\$30,000-\$49,999	21	32	27	22	16
\$50,000-\$74,999	24	23	28	27	22
\$75,000-\$99,999	32	14	12	19	16
\$100,000+	—	—	13	18	35
Religion					
Protestant	63	59	61	58	55
Catholic	16	17	17	18	16
Other Christian	12	16	16	16	20
Jewish	1	1	2	1	1
Something else	3	2	3	4	3
None	5	4	3	3	5

Notes: a. The displayed categories reflect those used in the 1996 and 2000 surveys. In 1988, the income categories were <\$12,500, \$12,500-\$24,999, \$25,000-\$34,999, \$35,000-\$49,999, and \$50,000+. In 1992, the top category represented \$75,000+. Total N of respondents in each survey: 1988=1,276; 1992=1,495; 1996=2,405; 2000=1,353; 2008=1,579.

Table 3.A6 Characteristics of the Texas Democratic Primary Electorate, 1984-2004

	1984	1988	1992	2000	2004	2008
Ideology						
Liberal	29	24	26	41	45	38
Moderate	52	45	44	41	40	40
Conservative	19	31	30	18	15	22
Age						
18-29	13	16	11	10	11	16
30-44	29	35	37	29	23	28
45-59	25	23	27	32	48	34
60+	33	25	25	29	19	22
Sex						
Male	42	48	49	46	48	43
Female	58	52	51	54	52	57
Race						
White	56	65	71	55	51	46
Black	34	22	17	24	22	19
Hispanic	9	10	12	20	24	32
Asian	—	—	<1	1	8	2
Other	1	1	<1	1	2	1
PID						
Democrat	83	69	65	77	74	66
Republican	2	6	6	4	5	9
Independent/Other	15	26	29	19	21	25
Education						
No high school diploma	19	11	9	—	7	6
High school graduate	22	29	24	—	22	19
Some college	25	28	34	—	30	32
College graduate	34	17	18	—	23	27
Postgraduate degree	—	15	14	—	18	15
Income^a						
<\$15,000	22	17	16	10	10	7
\$15,000-\$29,999	30	25	33	17	18	12
\$30,000-\$49,999	19	23	28	28	22	20
\$50,000-\$74,999	18	21	17	24	23	21
\$75,000-\$99,999	11	14	6	9	13	15
\$100,000+	—	—	—	11	14	25
Religion						
Protestant	—	51	47	37	31	27
Catholic	—	21	22	26	29	33
Other Christian	—	16	21	20	19	22
Jewish	—	2	1	3	1	1
Something else	—	7	6	8	10	6
None	—	3	4	7	9	11

Notes: a. The displayed categories reflect those used in the 2000 and 2004 surveys. In 1984 and 1988, the income categories were <\$12,500, \$12,500-\$24,999, \$25,000-\$34,999, \$35,000-\$49,999, and \$50,000+. In 1992, the top category represented \$75,000+. Total N of respondents in each survey: 1984=1,096; 1988=1,647; 1992=1,826; 2000=974; 2004=1,687; 2008=2,048.

Table 3.A7 Characteristics of the Southern Super Tuesday Republican Primary Electorate, 1988-2000

	1988	1996	2000
Ideology			
Liberal	7	7	8
Moderate	34	29	31
Conservative	59	64	61
Age			
18-29	16	10	7
30-44	29	27	19
45-59	25	28	26
60+	30	35	48
Sex			
Male	51	52	51
Female	49	48	49
Race			
White	95	—	—
Black	2	—	—
Hispanic	3	—	—
Asian	—	—	—
Other	<1	—	—
PID			
Democrat	6	4	3
Republican	70	76	80
Independent/Other	24	21	17
Education			
No high school diploma	6	4	—
High school graduate	24	20	—
Some college	32	31	—
College graduate	22	27	—
Postgraduate degree	16	18	—
Income			
<\$15,000	7	7	6
\$15,000-\$29,999	20	17	17
\$30,000-\$49,999	22	28	26
\$50,000-\$74,999	24	26	25
\$75,000-\$99,999	26	11	12
\$100,000+	12	13	—
Religion			
Protestant	63	59	58
Catholic	17	20	21
Other Christian	11	15	14
Jewish	2	2	2
Something else	3	3	3
None	4	3	3

Notes: Data are weighted. 1988: Total N of respondents included in analysis = 5,824. Southern states include: AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, TN, TX, and VA. 1996: Total N of respondents included in analysis = 9,166. Southern states include: FL, LA, MS, TN, and TX. 2000: Total N of respondents included in analysis = 4,101. Southern states include: FL, LA, MS, and TN.

Table 3.A8 Characteristics of the Southern Super Tuesday Democratic Primary Electorate, 1988 and 2000

	1988	2000
Ideology		
Liberal	25	39
Moderate	47	42
Conservative	29	20
Age		
18-29	14	8
30-44	30	23
45-59	24	28
60+	32	41
Sex		
Male	49	45
Female	51	55
Race		
White	69	65
Black	25	24
Hispanic	5	11
Asian	—	<1
Other	1	1
PID		
Democrat	73	79
Republican	6	4
Independent/Other	21	17
Education		
No high school diploma	13	—
High school graduate	32	—
Some college	25	—
College graduate	15	—
Postgraduate degree	15	—
Income		
<\$15,000	18	15
\$15,000-\$29,999	26	23
\$30,000-\$49,999	23	28
\$50,000-\$74,999	19	20
\$75,000-\$99,999	15	8
\$100,000+	7	—
Religion		
Protestant	49	40
Catholic	18	22
Other Christian	17	22
Jewish	5	5
Something else	7	7
None	4	5

Notes: Data are weighted. 1988: Total N of respondents included in analysis = 7,579. Southern states include: AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, TN, TX, and VA. 2000: Total N of respondents included in analysis = 4,560. Southern states include: FL, LA, MS, TN, and TX.

Notes

1. The data discussed in this section come from several sources: (1) vote shares (from 1972 to 1992) and primary dates (from 1972 to 2000) are from *Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections*, 3rd and 4th Editions (Congressional Quarterly 1994; Moore, Preimesberger, and Tarr 2001); (2) vote shares from 1996 to 2004 are from the *Almanac of American Politics* (Barone and Ujifusa 1997; Barone, Cohen, and Ujifusa 2001; Barone, Cohen, and Ujifusa 2005); (3) primary dates for 2004 are from the Federal Election Commission (www.fec.gov); (4) primary dates for 2008 are from the website of the *New York Times* (www.nytimes.com/pages/politics/index.html); and (5) vote shares for 2008 are from the CNN website (www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/) and selected secretaries of state or state election division websites.

2. In 1952 most Floridians backed Democratic US senator Richard B. Russell Jr. of Georgia, and in 1960 and 1968 Floridians favored their native son, Democratic US senator George Smathers.

3. As shown in Table 3.1, South Carolina was the only state that did not hold a Democratic primary in 1988.

4. Perhaps there was one candidate who was a consistent conservative: the former US senator Fred Thompson of Tennessee; but his late entry and lack of energy made it apparent that he was only casually interested in being the nation's next president.

5. In the South Carolina primary, Thompson's vote share was 15.6 percent and Huckabee's was 29.8 percent (South Carolina official results: www.state.sc.us/cgi-bin/scsec/scsec-repprisw-011908f.pl).

6. McCain won the most primary votes in Florida (36 percent), Mississippi (79 percent), North Carolina (74 percent), South Carolina (33 percent), Texas (51 percent), and Virginia (50 percent). Huckabee was the victor in Alabama (41 percent), Arkansas (60 percent), Georgia (34 percent), Louisiana (43 percent), and Tennessee (34 percent) (data are from the *New York Times*; politics.nytimes.com/election-guide/2008/results/votes/index.html).

7. We thank Rebekah Liscio for assistance in compiling these data.

8. Unlike the other four Deep South states (Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina), Georgia has seen much more population growth (from within and outside the South), is undergoing rapid urbanization, and has a large and politically active African American population centered in the greater Atlanta metropolitan area (see Woodard 2006).

9. We should mention that Texas has a hybrid primary-caucus system, and voters are eligible to take part in both formats. Given the higher costs of participating in a caucus, it is not surprising that the vast majority of Texans who participate in presidential nomination politics do so exclusively in primary contests.

10. As was the case throughout the nation, Clinton dominated the Hispanic vote in Texas, winning 66 percent (2008 exit poll).