

Supplemental Material for Hayes, Danny, and Seth C. McKee. 2012. “The Intersection of Redistricting, Race, and Participation.” *American Journal of Political Science*.

Because we lack precinct-level controls, there is a concern that the purported causal relationship between redistricting and roll-off could be spurious, the product of some unobserved variable(s). In response to a helpful suggestion from an anonymous reviewer, we conducted a difference-in-difference analysis on a subset of our data, in which we examine roll-off pre- and post-redistricting in the same precincts. For data reasons, our analysis is limited to the 1992 and 1996 elections in Florida, and the 2002 and 2004 elections in Texas.¹ All four of these elections followed a redistricting. Thus, we have four types of precincts: redrawn in year 1, but not year 2; not redrawn in year 1, redrawn in year 2; redrawn in both years; redrawn in neither year. (For purposes of this supplementary analysis, we drop any precincts that were in open seats in either election or that were uncontested. Our analysis thus examines redrawn and same-incumbent precincts that were in contested districts. We think this is a reasonable simplification, since this is the electoral scenario that characterizes the vast majority of congressional races.)

The key results, presented in Tables S-1 and S-2, are the differences in roll-off in the different categories of precincts. Starting with Florida, not surprisingly, there was very little difference in 1992 and 1996 in roll-off rates in precincts that were redrawn neither time. The slight increase (0.39 percentage point) in these precincts simply reflects higher roll-off rates in the 1996 election in general. Confirming our argument, roll-off in the precincts that were redrawn in 1992 but not 1996 was a statistically significant 2.3 percentage points higher in 1992 than 1996. This makes sense. In the year after residents of these precincts found themselves in an unfamiliar incumbent's

¹ We focus only on Florida and Texas because in addition to lacking data for many of our states for the election preceding a redistricting, it is also the case that a nontrivial number of precincts are added between elections and the numbers of the precincts change. In addition, many precincts' geographic boundaries are substantially altered, which limits the apples-to-apples comparisons we can make with such an analysis. Hence, we have data that lack the necessary precinct indicators to even perform this analysis in two states where it might otherwise be possible, Georgia and North Carolina.

district, roll-off was higher than four years later, when residents were in a precinct with an incumbent with whom they had presumably become familiar.

Table S-1. Roll-off Rates in the Same Florida Precincts, 1992-1996

	1992	1996	Difference
Not Redrawn (n=1429)	4.89	5.28	+0.39
Redrawn in 1992 Only (n=566)	8.13	5.83	-2.3
Redrawn in 1996 Only (n=22)	5.49	4.67	-0.82
Redrawn in Both 1992 and 1996 (n=9)	10.24	2.90	-7.34

However, precincts redrawn in 1996 but not 1992 do not show the same result—roll-off was about 0.82 percentage points (non-significant) higher in 1992 than 1996. This is evidence contrary to our argument. Likewise, the final category—redrawn in both years—shows higher roll-off in 1992 than 1996. To be sure, the number of precincts in these two categories—22 and nine, respectively—suggests our confidence in these patterns may be limited. But in Florida at least, the evidence is not universally confirmatory.

The evidence for a causal link is stronger in Texas. As shown in Table S-2, between the 2002 and 2004 elections, roll-off increased across the board. That is not a surprise: Roll-off is higher in presidential years than mid-term years. The key quantity is the size of the increase in roll-off. In precincts redrawn in neither year, the increase was 3.45 percentage points. In precincts redrawn in both years, the increase was about 3.67 points. These similarities are consistent with our argument, since the effect of redistricting is held constant in the two years for both categories of precincts. The remaining comparisons support the argument that redistricting causes roll-off to increase. Precincts redrawn in 2002 but not 2004 had increases in roll-off that were below the average—about 2.8 percentage points. At the same time, precincts redrawn in 2004 but not 2002 had the largest

increases in roll-off, about 4.3 percentage points. The substantive magnitude of the effect in this limited analysis is not large, but in general, these patterns support our causal interpretation of the relationship between redistricting and roll-off.

Table S-2. Roll-off Rates in the Same Texas Precincts, 1992-1996

	2002	2004	Difference
Not Redrawn (n=2379)	0.00	3.45	+3.45
Redrawn in 2002 Only (n=528)	0.02	2.90	+2.88
Redrawn in 2004 Only (n=1605)	-0.01	4.23	+4.24
Redrawn in Both 2002 and 2004 (n=272)	0.01	3.68	+3.67