

Inequality, Engagement and Representation

Abstract

Does political participation make a difference for policy responsiveness, or is affluence what matters most? To examine whether participation beyond voting matters for policy representation, we analyze policy congruence between citizens and their representatives using data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (2012). For the main policy issue for which citizens' political engagement beyond voting enhances policy congruence—namely, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010—we then investigate whether this effect holds even when taking income into account. The findings show that for the ACA policy issue, participation beyond voting increases constituents' congruence with their representatives at all levels of income, and that those at the lower end of the income scale experience the largest increase in congruence due to political activity beyond voting. At a time when income inequality and its impact on policy has become increasingly salient, this finding for the ACA suggests that for such a highly partisan and salient issue, political participation of the least wealthy can provide an important boost in policy representation. However, our findings across policy issues show that the potential of political participation and income in enhancing policy congruence is restricted to the case of highly partisan and salient issues.

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Aside from the issue of (illegal) immigration, few policies received as much focused attention in the 2016 presidential campaign than the Affordable Care Act of 2010, with Donald J. Trump proclaiming he would eliminate “Obamacare” on the first day in office. Campaign promises and political impossibilities aside, the stark reality of a Republican president, with majorities in the Senate and House, suggests that at least some features of the landmark health insurance legislation will be altered, if not eliminated, in the weeks or months to come.

As campaign rhetoric shifts to legislative policymaking, the question of who will be represented in any policy changes takes central stage. Only the hardiest of optimists today would suggest that representative democracy in the U.S. is strong: a gridlocked hyper-partisan Congress, the perennial advantages of the wealthy and organized (business) interests and a polarized, critical and disengaged public would seem to cripple popular governance. In 2016, a national survey on Congressional performance conducted by NORC Center for Public Affairs Research reported that 14% of respondents viewed the Democratic Party as responsive to the rank-and-file, while 8% viewed the Republican Party as responsive. In another national survey conducted in 2016, only 11% of likely voters believed that Congress was doing a good or excellent job, with the majority (57%) believing that Congress is doing a poor job. Moreover, 45% of respondents disagreed that their representative is the best possible person for the job.¹

¹ Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research Issue Brief. 2016. “The Frustrated Public: Views of the 2016 Campaign, the Parties and the Electoral Process,” <http://www.gallup.com/poll/5392/trust-government.aspx>. Accessed 12/13/16; Rasmussen Reports. 2016. “Congressional Performance: Voters Still Down on Congress. Friday, July 8, 2016.” http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/mood_of_america/congressional_performance.

Recent scholarly assessments of the linkages of electoral institutions and public opinion to policy outcomes provide little evidence to counter the public’s pessimistic views. Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels, for example, argue that elections are at best blunt instruments for citizens to register their policy preferences.² Likewise, Martin Gilens suggests that elections do not directly translate to equal representation for all citizens, but that impending elections make elected officials more responsive to broader public opinion, rather than only, or mostly, the opinions of the wealthy.³

Scholars of public opinion and policymaking only add to these negative assessments. In an innovative study of policymaking in the U.S. from 1981 through 2002, Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page conclude that the preferences of “average citizens” and mass public interest groups have little to no independent influence on policymaking.⁴ Instead, the preferences of economic elites and organized business interests are clearly and consistently associated with changes in public policy. These conclusions are broadly consistent with the work of a number of scholars who have extensively documented the privileged status of the wealthy in American democracy.⁵

This is a somber, but also incomplete, assessment of democratic politics in the U.S.⁶ What is missing is systematic evidence on whether citizens can take action to have their voices heard—and reflected more clearly in public policy⁷. Citizens in advanced democracies participate in an increasingly wide range of political activities, ranging from the traditional to non-traditional, electoral to non-electoral, online to in-person, and

² Achen and Bartels 2016.

³ Gilens 2012.

⁴ Gilens and Page 2014.

⁵ See, for example, Bartels 2008; Gilens 2012; Hacker and Pierson 2010; Page, Bartels and Seawright 2013; Rawls 1993; Schlozman, Verba and Brady 2012.

⁶ Dahl 1989; Lijphart 1997; Pateman 2012.

⁷ For discussion on the surprising lack of research on this topic despite the wealth of research on political participation and its correlates see, for example, Bartels 2009: 168; Schlozman 2002: 461.

partisan to consumer engagements—presumably intent on persuading elected officials to represent their views.⁸ Yet only rarely have scholars tackled, head on, the question of whether the activities that citizens engage in have a substantive impact on public policy.⁹ Despite well-established, rich literatures in American and comparative political behavior on the correlates, levels and trends in political participation, those that link political action to specific policy outcomes are rare.¹⁰

The 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA) is a convenient illustration of our inattention to the efficacy of citizen engagement. How does one explain the historic passage of major health care reform despite the fact that most wealthy citizens opposed the bill, and did so in an era when their privileged position is so well-established? Perhaps, one might argue, this was a partisan battle of wealthy elites, and supportive elites came out on top, producing an unusual and exceptional case of elite domination in the interests of the poor (or uninsured). But explanations that focus *solely* on elites do not, and cannot, provide evidence as to whether the mass public had any role in such an important policy outcome.

Most accounts of the Affordable Care Act of 2010 have focused on elite politics and the legislative process, with little to no attention paid to the role of public opinion or citizen engagement.¹¹ Indeed, the most publicized aspect of the mass politics of the ACA were poll results that demonstrated the strong opposition of the wealthy to passage of the landmark legislation. It is hard to imagine an explanation for this passage that does not require some attention to the nature of mass politics surrounding the legislation. As

⁸ Bateson 2012; Blais 2000; Bowler et al. 2003; Dalton 2008; Finkel 2002; Franklin 2004; Han 2016; Kostadinova and Power 2007; Oser 2016; Oser et al. 2014; Tavits 2009.

⁹ Note that the classic works on political participation and on voter turnout (e.g., Verba, et al. 1978; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980) set the agenda for subsequent research on these topics with a focus on the correlates of participation and not on the policy consequences of participation.

¹⁰ See for example Gillion 2012; Hooghe and Oser 2016; Htun and Weldon 2010.

¹¹ The notable exception to this point is Tesler (2012), who studies the racialization of support for the ACA.

Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page suggest, even an elite-driven policy process might, for some particular issues or legislation, from time-to-time witness the “average citizen” playing more than a negligible role.¹²

Knowing whether (or when) the “average citizen” or the “activist citizen” has an impact on policy decisions—on the ACA, or any other issue— is an essential feature of democratic politics, but one that scholars of political institutions and policymaking have essentially ignored. Does citizen participation matter for public policy in the U.S.? Are citizen activists better represented in members of Congress’ roll call votes than those citizens who are not politically active? These are important questions that deserve our attention.

Preferences, Participation and Policy

The most visible recent research on legislative representation in the U.S. addresses the essential conflict between economic inequality and political equality that has long been an issue of public and academic concern.¹³ Numerous studies substantiate the claim that the policy preferences of the rich are better represented than the poor.¹⁴ Larry Bartels, for example, finds that Senators in 1988, 1990 and 1992 were disproportionately responsive to opinions of the wealthy (vs. middle-income or low-income constituency opinion), especially on ideological roll call votes and abortion roll call votes (though not as strongly in all cases).¹⁵ He notes that partisan differences in

¹² Gilens and Page 2014.

¹³ APSA 2004; Erikson 2015; Franko et al. 2016; Hacker and Pierson 2010; Leighley and Nagler 2014; Lijphart 1997; Schlozman, Verba and Brady 2012; Skocpol 2004; Soroka and Wlezien 2008; Verba 2003; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995.

¹⁴ Bartels 2008; Ellis 2012; Franko, Kelly and Witko 2014; Gilens 2009, 2012; Jacobs and Page 2005; Shapiro 2011.

¹⁵ In other work, Bartels suggests that representational advantages also accrue to subgroups with greater voting power (i.e., the relative size of the group, which determines the number of potential votes it represents). Because the wealthy are more likely than the poor to vote, wealthier individuals enjoy substantial voting power (Bartels 2008; Leighley and Nagler 2014).

responsiveness—where Republican Senators are more responsive to the opinions of the wealthy, but neither Republican nor Democratic Senators are responsive to the preferences of the poor—suggest that poor individuals indeed have *indirect* influence on Senators by virtue of their choice of who represents them on election day.

Bartels acknowledges that the observed responsiveness to high-income individuals may well reflect that these individuals share the attitudes of political and economic elites, and that it is not constituents, per se, to whom Senators are directly responsive. This possibility aside, Bartels suggests that participating in activities other than voting—and not voting itself—may partly account for why wealthy voters are better represented than middle-class or poor voters.¹⁶ Barber’s analysis of the ideological similarities between Senators and campaign contributors likewise suggests that contributing to legislators enhances the ideological correspondence between them.¹⁷

The traditional studies of legislative representation upon which this scholarship relies examine roll-call voting decisions of legislators as reflecting their ideological and partisan preferences, in addition to various aspects of the electoral context. The most consistent findings highlight the critical role of (full district) constituent preferences and co-partisan preferences both (i.e., independently), affirming the “electoral connection” as a fundamental aspect of legislative representation.¹⁸ Co-partisan preferences, it is argued, matter more than general district opinion, as they are key to members’ re-election prospects.¹⁹

¹⁶ Bartels 2008: 275-281.

¹⁷ Barber 2016.

¹⁸ For a recent review of this work, see Hill, Jordan and Hurley 2015; also see Gilens 2012, Ch. 6.

¹⁹ See, for example, Broockman 2014; Grimmer 2013; Jacobson 2003; Mayhew 2004; Powell 2004. On macro-level, rather than micro-level representation, see Bafumi and Herron 2010.

The one specific instance where we have some evidence that participation is associated with policy outcomes is the case of voting. John Griffin and Brian Newman have shown that when voters differ from nonvoters in their policy preferences, voters' preferences are weighted more heavily in Senators' roll-call votes.²⁰ This finding is consistent with evidence that elected officials reward those who vote with policy benefits. Paul Martin demonstrates that members of Congress reward high turnout precincts with higher allocations of federal grant rewards, while Sarah Anzia shows that (state) policy benefits are greater for those groups (e.g., public school teachers) whose turnout is higher.²¹ Kim Hill and Jan Leighley have shown that higher turnout among the poor is associated with increased welfare benefit levels in the U.S. states, and others have provided this evidence for industrialized democracies more generally.²²

John Griffin and Brian Newman identify two mechanisms that likely account for voters' preferences being privileged over those of non-voters: electoral incentives, i.e., the *election/selection* hypothesis, and the superior communication of voter preferences to elected officials through voters' engagement in other information-rich types of participation beyond voting (the *communication* hypothesis).²³ Their aggregate, state-wide analysis of Senatorial roll call voting from 1974-2002—the most direct evidence we have on the consequences of non-electoral participation on representation—shows that the association between voters' views and Senatorial roll call votes reduces substantially when “communicators” views are included in the multivariable model. Bartels, on the other hand, finds no support for turnout as the mechanism linking Senators' roll call

²⁰ Griffin and Newman 2005.

²¹ Anzia 2014; Martin 2003.

²² Hicks and Swank 1992; Hill and Leighley 1992; Hill, Leighley and Hinton-Andersson; Mahler 2008.

²³ Griffin and Newman 2005; on the general importance of constituent communication with elected representatives for representation, see Miler 2010; on racial differences in communication, see Brockman 2014.

voting with the preferences of wealthy, middle income or poor constituents.²⁴ Our evidence on whether citizens who vote, or those who engage in political activities other than voting, are better represented than non-participants, then, is relatively thin, outdated and indirect, surely falling short of the importance of this question to democratic politics in the U.S. today.

Below, we show that for certain types of policy issues for which theory predicts that citizen engagement will make a difference, citizens who are politically active are better represented than those who are not. We also show that engaging in participatory activities can virtually eliminate the over-representation of the wealthy in democratic policy-making in the U.S. for certain types of policy issues. Although the optimism offered by this evidence is tempered by the reality that such enhanced representation is limited to highly-salient, highly-partisan issues, it nonetheless affirms that citizen engagement can be an effective linkage between citizens' policy preferences and the actual policies produced by elected officials.

Research Design, Data and Methods

Our empirical evidence is drawn from the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), which includes data on individuals' opinions on a number of political issues for which we also have roll call votes taken by members of Congress.²⁵ The key advantage of using these data is that the survey is conducted using a sample that is sufficiently large to allow robust (congressional) district-level analyses that match elected representatives' roll call behavior to respondent preferences on those specific issues.

²⁴ Bartels also offers indirect evidence that suggests that contacting government officials, or possibly making campaign contributions, might account for differential responsiveness (2008: 275-80).

²⁵ Ansolabehere 2013; Ansolabehere and Rivers 2013; Flavin 2012.

The CCES also includes questions about constituents' political engagement, including political donating, (validated) voting in the general election, and other political activities (namely attending a political meeting, engaging in campaign activity or displaying signs), all of which we use in the analysis below.²⁶ We examine voting and donating separately, given their potentially distinctive implications for the study of political representation, but combine the other activities into an indicator of engagement in non-voting participation.

Our analytical strategy departs from previous studies in two notable respects. First, we measure policy congruence *separately by issue* rather than combining respondents' positions on multiple issues into one measure of policy preference and matching that to legislators' roll call votes. Using an issue-specific congruence measure allows us to examine theoretically-expected variations in congruence based on the nature of the issue rather than assuming that congruence is expected across an entire set of issues. The theoretical expectation that issue-specific representation varies is an overlooked aspect of Miller and Stokes' classic work on dyadic representation, as discussed in greater detail by Kim Hill, Soren Jordan and Patricia Hurley, and noted as a fruitful path in recent research.²⁷

Second, we estimate policy congruence models *for those issues on which participants and non-participants in a district support opposite policy stances* on issues, i.e., for "conflict districts." This strategy of focusing on units of analysis in which salient groups hold opposing policy preferences is analytically necessary in order to reach persuasive conclusions on whether participation makes a difference for policy

²⁶ See appendix for additional information on participation measures.

²⁷ Hill, Jordan and Hurley 2014. See also Barabas 2016; Gilens and Page 2014; Griffin and Newman 2013: 62-63; Wlezien 2004.

representation.²⁸ If there is no difference in the preferred course of policy action for those who are politically active versus those who are inactive, then any conclusion that political participation “matters” for policy congruence is difficult to sustain.²⁹

Figure 1 documents the level of policy support of participants and non-participants in those districts in which participants and non-participants supported opposite courses of policy action (i.e., in “conflict districts” only).³⁰ As shown in Figure 1, the preferences of participants and non-participants were significantly different on five CCES policy questions that were matched to the roll call vote of respondents’ representatives: the repeal of the Affordable Care Act, Keystone Pipeline XL, Simpson-Bowles, Korean Free Trade Agreement, and “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT).³¹

Figure 1A and 1B indicate that for every activity, participants in conflict districts were less supportive of the ACA repeal and more supportive of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” repeal amendment than were non-participants, although the magnitude of the difference varies by participation type.

[Figure 1 About Here]

On Keystone XL, activists and donors are more supportive of the pipeline bill than those who were not active or did not donate. Voters, however, were less supportive

²⁸ See appendix for the definition and operationalization of conflict districts. See also Griffin and Newman 2005; Soroka and Wlezien 2008.

²⁹ Note how the restriction to conflict districts reflects the concerns of scholars’ criticizing Bartels’ analysis, where it is argued that the statistical findings of greater responsiveness to wealthy, as opposed to less wealthy, individuals might well be a statistical artifact should wealthy and less wealthy individuals hold similar attitudes (e.g., Stimson 2009).

³⁰ As documented in the appendix, the only policy issue in the CCES 2012 for which participants and non-participants did not support opposite courses of policy action in meaningful numbers was the Ryan Budget Act, which was overwhelmingly opposed by most respondents.

³¹ The DADT vote was on an amendment that would have eliminated funding for military chaplain’s training as part of the previous repeal; hence, voting against the amendment would convey support for DADT (see footnote 35 below for more details). The CCES includes two measures of respondents’ support for the ACA; for purpose of brevity, we report only analyses using the question fielded at the time of the first repeal vote. Estimates based on the second vote are similar as those we report below.

of the pipeline than were non-voters. On both Simpson-Bowles and Korean Free Trade, participants of all types are less supportive than non-participants.

In sum, Figure 1 shows that the largest differences between participants and non-participants are evidenced for the three issues that are more clearly partisan, i.e., ACA, DADT and Keystone XL. The ACA participatory bias favors the liberal/Democratic position for every type of participation, while the participatory bias in the case of DADT is conservative, i.e., participants were less supportive than non-participants. In contrast, for Keystone the participatory bias varies by the type of participation: voters were less supportive of the pipeline while activists and donators were more supportive. To the extent that engaging in political activities conveys important substantive information to legislators regarding constituent preferences, it is important to note that such signals were generally consistent across participation types for the ACA repeal and DADT. For Keystone, the “information rich” actions of donors and activists reflected different preferences than voters.

Having identified the issues on which participant and non-participant opinion differs, we next establish the theoretical linkages expected in each of these cases. We derive our hypotheses regarding the linkages between voting and policy congruence from Hill, Jordan and Hurley’s (2015) theory of dyadic representation, which asserts five issue-specific models that vary as to the expected causal direction(s) between constituent and policy-maker preferences, as well as on whether constituents influence specific policy decisions (i.e., roll call votes) cast by legislators.³² For our purposes, the key

³² New, simple and cross-cutting issues should reflect an *instructed delegate* model; complicated and cross-cutting issues the *trustee* model; established, simple and party-defining issues the *responsible party* model; complicated and party-defining issues reflect the *party-elite led* model; and established, simple and cross-cutting issues the *belief-sharing* model. For a graphical presentation of the five models, see Hill, Jordan and Hurley 2015: 40. We are ambivalent about the direction of the causal influences represented in these models, focusing instead on participatory acts as linkage mechanisms between constituents and legislators.

theoretical expectations—affirmed in Hill, Jordan and Hurley’s analyses—are that the *instructed delegate*, *responsible party* and *belief sharing* models anticipate policy congruence between constituent opinion, legislators’ preferences, and members’ roll call voting behavior while the *trustee* and *instructed delegate* models anticipate no such correspondence.

Using Hill, Jordan and Hurley’s issue typology we categorized each of our five issues based on legislative history, public opinion data and partisan support to determine whether we should expect policy congruence between voters or participants’ preferences and members’ roll call votes.³³ We identified three issues that we expect to follow a *Responsible Parties* model: the repeal of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the Keystone XL pipeline, and the DADT repeal amendment. Each of these issues meets the model’s criteria, in that they are documented as established, simple and party-defining issues for which we would expect policy congruence.

We identified the Korean Free Trade Agreement and Simpson-Bowles, in contrast, as complicated, cross-cutting issues reflective of the *Trustee* model, which anticipates no constituency influence. Testing for the absence of constituency influence is appropriate as we have specific theoretical reasons to expect null results, and any such evidence provides some perspective on any “positive” effects identified in the analyses of the Responsible Parties issues.

Policy congruence can be understood as the degree to which citizens’ policy preference is similar to the policy choices that are made by their elected representatives.³⁴ We operationalize policy congruence by coding a respondent as “congruent” (coded “1”) on a policy issue when their policy preference is consistent with the roll call vote of their

³³ See appendix for details.

³⁴ Griffin and Newman 2013: 52.

elected representative. Conversely, when respondents' policy preferences differ from the votes of their representatives, they are coded as "non-congruent" on that policy issue (coded "0").³⁵ This measure is similar to Griffin and Newman's measure of policy representation where they code individuals whose opinions are consistent with the roll call votes of legislators "winners" and those whose opinions are not consistent with the roll call votes of legislators "losers."

We develop separate policy congruence measures for all five issues. Our expectations are that the differences in policy congruence between participants and non-participants should be greater for *Responsible Parties* model issues than for *Trustee* model issues, and this is what we see in Figure 2. This expectation reflects the assumption that the electoral incentive is at work on highly salient partisan issues but absent—or far less likely—on trustee issues for which constituency preferences are not expected to be weighed heavily by legislators.

[Figure 2 About Here]

Policy congruence is generally higher for all types of participation for both the ACA repeal and the Keystone Pipeline XL issues, while differences in policy congruence between participants and non-participants on Korean Free Trade and Simpson-Bowles are, with one exception, either insignificant or indicate less policy congruence for participants. "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is the only issue of the five for which the bivariate relationship between policy congruence and citizen engagement is inconsistent with our theoretical expectations. Despite being classified as a *Responsible Parties* issue, as shown in Figure 2B, for each type of activity, activists are less congruent than non-activists with

³⁵ We emphasize again that we are not seeking to establish the directionality of influence in the dyadic relationship between elected officials and constituents. Note that our measure of policy congruence would reflect bi-directional causal influences if they exist, but does not distinguish between the two theoretical linkages.

their elected officials. Taking confidence intervals into account, however, the size of the congruence gap is relatively small for this policy issue, and subsequent regression analyses reported below show that the difference is not statistically significant.³⁶

Generally, then, policy congruence seems to vary more across issue type than by type of participation. But these patterns do not speak to whether policy congruence reflects the partisan linkages predicted by the *Responsible Parties* model, in contrast to the *Trustee* model, and whether participation in activities other than voting enhances the policy congruence between elected officials and citizens. We offer this more detailed evidence in the next section.

Analysis: Responsible Parties vs. Trustee Models

Our baseline model of policy congruence includes whether the individual identifies with the same party as their elected representative, whether they voted (validated), and an interaction term consisting of co-partisanship and voting. As the dependent variable of policy congruence is dichotomous, we conduct logistic regression analyses. This simple model allows us to test whether voters enjoy greater policy congruence than non-voters, and whether constituents who are co-partisans of the elected official enjoy greater policy congruence.

A positive and significant coefficient estimate for having voted would indicate that voters are privileged over non-voters in terms of policy congruence. This provides a test of the selection-reelection hypothesis. The Responsible Parties model suggests that

³⁶ We can speculate on two explanations worthy of further research for why for the DADT policy issue these bivariate relationships are not consistent with our theoretical expectations. A first possible explanation is that policy congruence was reduced on this Responsible Parties issue as a reflection of the complex bundle of issues in the bill, and another feature of the bill related to the closure of Guantanamo, which became the more salient feature of legislative discussion. Second, this “issue” might be more appropriately labeled as a Trustees issue, since it was introduced as an amendment to a military spending bill. In the concluding section we refer to the general challenge of investigating specific bills with idiosyncratic features for the study of policy congruence.

on these issues, co-partisans will be privileged in their policy congruence relative to those who are not co-partisans of the elected official. Positive and significant coefficients for co-partisanship would confirm this theoretical expectation.

Our basic tests of the selection/re-election hypothesis are presented in model 1 for each of our five issues. On two out of three of the *Responsible Parties* issues—the ACA repeal and Keystone XL—the act of voting is associated with enhanced policy congruence. In contrast, and as expected, on neither of the two *Trustee* issues is the act of voting associated with greater policy congruence.

[Table 1 About Here]

We also expect that co-partisans will enjoy greater policy congruence than non-co-partisans for the *Responsible Parties*, but not the *Trustee*, issues. Consistent with our expectations, we find no association between co-partisanship and policy congruence for Simpson-Bowles and Korean Free Trade. And, consistent with our expectations for the *Responsible Parties* issues, co-partisans enjoy greater policy congruence than non-co-partisans on the ACA (see Table 1, ACA Model 2). The enhanced representation enjoyed by co-partisans on the ACA repeal is graphed in the predicted margins plot in Figure 3. While the importance of partisanship in structuring electoral and legislative politics is rarely underestimated, the dramatic difference in policy congruence that is illustrated for co-partisan, compared to non-co-partisan, voters, is striking.

[Figure 3 About Here]

Less consistent evidence regarding co-partisanship is shown in Model 2 for Keystone XL and DADT, as reported in Table 1, Model 2, for these two issues. For Keystone XL, policy congruence is not enhanced for co-partisans, although voting remains a correlate of policy congruence. The estimates for “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” suggest that neither voting, nor being co-partisans, enhance constituents’ policy

congruence. Thus, our simple dyadic representation models suggest that voting enhances policy congruence with legislators for the ACA and Keystone, but not DADT, while heightened attention to co-partisans is evidenced only for the ACA.

Next, we consider whether engaging in additional types of activity beyond voting accounts for the superior representation of voters on these two issues, i.e., the communication hypothesis. We begin by asking whether those who donate money, or those who participate in non-electoral activities enjoy greater policy congruence.³⁷ To answer this question we use the election/selection model estimated in Table 1, substituting each type of activity for voting as the participation of interest (along with the related interaction term with co-partisanship). We present these models only for the two issues for which the election/selection hypothesis was confirmed in Table 1: the ACA and Keystone.

If the communication hypothesis is correct, and it is not voting, but participating in other ways, that enhances policy congruence, then testing whether there is an association between these alternative types of participation and policy congruence should also yield significant estimates. And if the conventional wisdom that contributors receive more policy benefits, i.e., greater policy congruence, than non-contributors is correct for these issues, then we should observe significant and positive coefficients on donating.

Once again we see distinctive results for the two issues. As shown in Table 2, for the ACA, both donating and participating in other activities enhances the policy

³⁷ Until recently, the study of the policy impact of contributions has focused almost exclusively on the effectiveness of PAC contributions to members of Congress, rather than the impact of individual donations; see Rocca and Gordon 2012 for a recent example. Consistent with this approach, we assume that the “indirect” impact of contributing is most likely to be evidenced as a part of the election/selection hypothesis, where candidates with more money are more likely to be re-elected. Barber (2016), however, studies the ideological impact of a representative sample of contributors on Senators, quite different from our interest in the political act of donating by individuals in a nationally-representative population survey and its relative importance to other political activities.

congruence of co-partisans, as demonstrated in the predicted margins plot in Figure 4. In contrast, only co-partisan donations are associated with enhanced policy congruence for Keystone XL, while engaging in other activities, whether co-partisan or not, does not enhance policy congruence. Thus, only for the ACA does the basic assumption of the communication hypothesis—that participation in participatory acts other than voting accounts for the relationship between voting and policy congruence—hold. As a result, it is unlikely that alternative forms of participation account for the privileged representation of voters on the Keystone pipeline.³⁸

[Table 2 and Figure 4 About Here]

The positive results for the ACA—where participation beyond voting enhances policy congruence—suggest that for this issue the linkages between participation and policy congruence are evident across all types of political activity when considering the distinctive types of participation separately.³⁹ Whether this finding is confirmed when taking into account different types of participation in the same model is an important (and different) question. We address this question below, estimating a model consisting of each type of participation (voting, donating and activism), co-partisanship, and each type of participation interacted with co-partisanship. To the extent that participation other

³⁸ We speculate that the lack of co-partisan influence may be reflected in the mixed signals that the bill provided: to allow for the Democratic president to expedite the review process and make a decision within a particular timeframe. It might also reflect the peculiar importance of political contributions on this issue—but this, too, is speculation. We also estimated the same models for the other issues, where voting was not associated with greater policy congruence. On Korean Free Trade, greater policy congruence is associated with donating. On Simpson-Bowles, donating and activism are associated with less policy congruence. On “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell,” no political acts were significantly associated with congruence.

³⁹ We also estimated models of policy congruence using an additive “win ratio” index which is the number of the five issues on which the respondent is congruent with her representative. These estimates confirm the general patterns that we report finding for the Responsible Parties issues, and especially the ACA: higher policy congruence/win ratio results not from the acts of voting, donating or other types of political activity, but is mediated by the partisanship of the participant. In other words, legislators respond to *active* co-partisans across all types of participation. As the findings are based on an additive index of disparate policy types, the insights discussed in the present study regarding dynamics of policy congruence for different types of policy issues are obscured. These results are available in the appendix (Table A2).

than voting is associated with enhanced policy congruence, we should see significant effects of participation other than voting as correlates of policy congruence. In addition to accounting for the role of non-voting participation in the association between voting and policy congruence, we also consider the association between individuals' income and policy congruence.

The Economic Biases of Representative Democracy

Thus far, our evidence on who is best represented focuses on what citizens do, and whether they are co-partisans. We now expand the analysis to consider how this evidence stands up to arguments regarding the privileged representation of the wealthy—for the ACA. As we noted above, numerous studies have concluded that elected officials respond more to the preferences of wealthy citizens than those of middle-income and poor citizens. Others have suggested citizen engagement in various types of participation as one possible explanation for such enhanced representation. We turn the question on its head, and ask instead whether engaging in activities beyond voting might help to counter the over-representation of the wealthy. Because the ACA issue is the only issue on which both voting and non-electoral activity is associated with increased congruence, we restrict this test to this one issue alone.

Parallel to the depiction above of the bivariate association between *political participation* and policy support (Figure 1) and congruence (Figure 2) we present below for that same set of issues the associations between income and policy support (Figure 5) and congruence (Figure 6). Figures 5 and 6 therefore graph the mean support for policy issues and mean policy congruence on these issues, respectively, by income thirds of the CCES sample, though as noted we now focus on further interpreting the ACA in particular.

Contrary to popular accounts, at the time of the CCES survey, Figure 5 shows that the highest and middle-income groups were less supportive of the ACA repeal than was the lowest income group, with the differences between the two higher income groups insignificant. Consistent with previous research on the privileged representation of the wealthy, Figure 6 shows that the wealthiest third of individuals enjoyed significantly greater policy congruence, though the difference between the wealthiest and the middle-income group is small.

[Figures 5 and 6 About Here]

To investigate whether political action can counter the advantage of the wealthy in terms of policy congruence, we return to the simple model consisting of voting and co-partisan (as estimated for the ACA in Table 1, Model 2) and add to that model individuals' (family) income and an interaction term consisting of income and co-partisanship as two additional correlates of policy congruence.

The estimates for this model for the ACA are shown in Table 3 (column 1), and suggest that co-partisan voters enjoy a greater level of policy congruence than non-co-partisans, as we showed in Table 1. In addition, the estimates for the new terms are significant, suggesting that wealthy co-partisans also enjoy greater policy congruence than poorer non-partisans. The predicted margins plot in Figure 7 shows that for the ACA policy issue, wealth enhances policy congruence among voters, but only for voters who are co-partisans.

[Table 3 and Figure 7 About Here]

Table 3 also presents estimates of two additional models of policy congruence: , one which tests for the effects of voting, participation beyond voting, income; and the other which includes each of these indicators as well as standard demographic correlates of political participation. In column 2 we include in the model participation in other

types of activities, and those activities interacted with co-partisanship, to test whether engaging in activities other than voting accounts for voters' representational advantages (i.e., the communications hypothesis). This allows us to test whether policy congruence is also enhanced for co-partisans who engage in other types of (non-voting) political activities. Here the results differ for political activism and donating. The interaction estimate for activism and co-partisanship is not significant, whereas the estimates for donating are: policy congruence is enhanced for individuals who make political contributions, but co-partisans enjoy this advantage more than non-co-partisans. Thus, for both voter turnout and political donations, co-partisans are more policy congruent than are non-co-partisans.

The final model reported in Table 3, column 3, includes demographic characteristics that are often associated with voter turnout and other types of political participation.⁴⁰ Including these characteristics provides a more demanding test of our hypotheses regarding policy congruence, co-partisanship, voting and engagement. As in the case of the more limited model estimated in column 2, these estimates confirm the critical role of co-partisanship in understanding how voting and other types of political participation enhance policy congruence. They also confirm that wealthier individuals are privileged in their policy congruence with elected officials, regardless of other notable individual characteristics of participants and partisans.

The complexity of this model of policy congruence makes simple assessments of substantively important associations difficult. Nonetheless, the advantage of such a model is that it allows us to assess the extent to which participatory engagement can help

⁴⁰ Including these demographics also allows us to account for the relative voting power of various demographic groups (see Griffin and Newman 2013).

to overcome the over-representation of the wealthy. This possibility is illustrated in Figure 8, which is perhaps the most important finding that we present. The figure shows the predicted margins for the interactive effect of income on congruence for those who “only” vote (the “no alternative behaviors” plot) in comparison to those who vote and are also active in additional ways (“all alternative behaviors” plot).

[Figure 8 About Here]

The findings demonstrate that engaging in participation beyond voting increases constituents’ congruence with their representatives at all levels of income. Importantly, those at the lower end of the income scale get the highest boost in congruence due to political activity beyond voting. At a time when income inequality and its impact on policy has become increasingly salient, this finding for the ACA points to one policy issue for which additional political activity makes a difference for policy representation, even, and especially, among the less affluent.

To further illustrate the potential power of citizen engagement to overcome the representational advantages of the wealthy, we also estimate a more restricted model using an index measuring the *number* of activities an individual votes in out of our three separate predictors of participation. This provides a check on the possibility that it is the number of activities individuals engage in, and not the specific variations across participation type, that are relevant to policy congruence on the ACA. These results are reported in Table 4; the first model includes the participation index only; the next includes co-partisanship; the next income; and the final model includes a series of interaction terms between co-partisanship, income and co-partisanship.

[Table 4 About Here]

Each of these sets of estimates is consistent with our previous findings using other models and measures. In the final model, we see that co-partisanship moderates the

effects of participation on ACA policy congruence. Once co-partisanship is included in the model, we see no enhanced effect of income save for that which is conveyed through legislators responding to higher income co-partisans.

The critical role of co-partisanship is illustrated in the plots of the marginal effects of income on policy congruence, estimated separately for co-partisans and non-co-partisans, as shown in Figure 9. These plots demonstrate the distinctiveness of policy congruence for co-partisans and non-co-partisans, highlighting the potential power of citizen activism to reduce the representational advantages of the wealthy. As shown in the graph for co-partisans (Figure 9A), responsiveness is greater for wealthier individuals at all levels of citizen engagement—except for those who participate at the highest levels. For these fully active citizens, increasing levels of income do not enhance policy congruence with their elected officials. Importantly, however, for those who are less active, differences in congruence between activists and non-activists are small at the highest levels of income.

[Figure 9 About Here]

In contrast, for non-co-partisans (Figure 9B), the probability of congruence is relatively flat across levels of income, except for individuals who engage in one activity, where congruence actually decreases across income levels. That is, the wealthiest non-co-partisans, even if modestly active, actually are less well represented than the poorest of those non-co-partisans.

Discussion

In this study we have investigated how linkages between citizens' policy preferences and legislators' roll call votes vary with respect to whose opinions are represented in legislators' policy choices. Our primary interest was not in untangling the likely reciprocal relationship between the two, but instead to focus on how citizens'

political engagement acts as a linkage mechanism between citizens and legislators. We were also motivated to address whether wealthier citizens enjoy greater policy congruence with their elected representatives than do the poor. Our theoretical expectations anticipated that the answers to these questions would vary depending on the issue at hand—whether new or old, party polarized or not, and simple or complex. This approach to move studies of dyadic representation beyond aggregate measures of policy congruence provides a more nuanced understanding of policy congruence, but also imposes a certain complexity in terms of theoretical expectations that vary across issues. Our results nonetheless reflect fairly consistently on these expectations.

Generally, the findings suggest a positive association between co-partisans and voters with legislators' roll call votes, but only *for those issues where we expect a traditional "responsible parties" model of representation*. A significant role for other types of political participation is evidenced only for a single policy issue (the ACA repeal), where both voting and additional political activity enhance the congruence between individuals' preferences and legislators' roll call votes.

Our evidence thus points to the importance of both voting *and* additional acts of political participation (whether controlling for individuals' demographic characteristics or not) on this one issue. Not on all issues, and not even on all *Responsible Parties* model issues. For the ACA, then, we find support for the plausibility of the "communication" hypothesis: political activity in addition to voting is associated with increased policy congruence, which may help explain the reason why voting enhances policy representation for this policy issue. That this linkage is observed only for the most highly visible, highly contested partisan issue of the Obama administration underscores the importance of attention to policy issue type in efforts to investigate the linkages between citizen participation and policy outcomes.

We also find that the act of donating does not eliminate the privileged linkage between voters and representatives' roll call votes on the ACA. It is important to note, of course, that wealthier individuals tend to contribute more than poorer individuals, and in this sense our finding on the impact of donating on ACA is consistent with those who argue that the wealthy are advantaged in terms of political representation. However, in analyses that controlled for both income and donating in the same model, our findings indicate that only the act of donating has an independent positive association with policy congruence.

For complex issues—Korean Free Trade and Simpson-Bowles—where we anticipated a *Trustee* model of representation, neither voting, co-partisanship nor non-voting participation are associated with enhanced policy congruence. As a result constituency opinions are of little import to policy congruence. This conclusion is consistent with Miller and Stokes' original (1963) argument, and further underscores the importance of issue-specific analyses in studies of representation. The use of aggregate policy indices that is common in representation studies today is not without its limitations.

Regarding the question of whether affluence matters for policy congruence, our findings point to the relevance of wealth to democratic politics in the U.S. in several ways. Our empirical evidence on this point focuses on the one issue for which we had clear, consistent evidence that voters, activists and co-partisans enjoy greater policy congruence than nonvoters, non-activists and non-co-partisans. And so this is an interesting case—of a high-visibility, simple/established party issue that distinguishes the two major parties—on which to ask whether individuals' wealth enhances their policy congruence. Our evidence suggests that the wealthy—but especially the wealthy who are politically active and co-partisan—do indeed enjoy greater policy congruence. More

work needs to be done to assess whether such findings would hold on other highly salient *Responsible Parties* issues beyond the case of the ACA in 2012—or on votes on the repeal in 2016 and beyond. Perhaps the new presidential administration and Congress will provide us such opportunities.

While we have confirmed the enhanced representational privilege of the wealthy for the ACA repeal, we have also provided new and unique evidence that engaging in political activity other than voting allows less wealthy individuals to enjoy greater policy congruence. Thus, the perceived advantages of wealthy individuals in participating in activities other than voting may not be as generalizable as has been suggested. Participating beyond voting seems to be an important mechanism linking citizens to their elected representatives for particular types of policy issues, and strategic action that takes advantage of this insight might help to counter the general representational advantages of the wealthy in American democracy.

An obvious challenge for future research of policy congruence that follow the approach of investigating separate policy issues instead of the common analytical approach of aggregate indices is that specific bills can include anomalous features—such as the DADT bill in this study—or take place in a unique context that hampers further generalization. Despite this challenge, the findings of the present study also shed light on the important benefits of paying closer attention to policy issue type in the study of differential representation for the politically active and the wealthy. While citizens' democratic engagement may not increase policy representation on all issues, our findings show that citizen engagement can make a difference for highly partisan and salient issues like the ACA. And while wealth may be positively associated with policy representation in general, the findings of the present study show that for an issue like the ACA, political participation of the least wealthy can provide an important boost in representation that

can essentially level the playing field of policy representation for the least wealthy if they are also politically active.

In sum, we find that both political participation and affluence are important for policy congruence, but that variations in representational linkages across issues are substantial. As we shift to a new presidential administration which seeks to change the way Washington works, expectations are that the partisanship will continue to structure both mass and elite behavior. Whether the responsiveness of elected officials to engaged citizens, and especially partisans, changes or not will be a critical test of our representative democracy.

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Appendix

1. Conflict districts for each policy issue by political activity

The rationale spelled out by Soroka and Wlezien (2008) and Griffin and Newman (2013) clarifies the importance of focusing attention on units of analysis in which salient groups hold opposing policy preferences. To adapt Griffin and Newman's (2013: 55) example for the purposes of our study: if a piece of legislation is supported by 90% of politically active citizens and 60% of politically inactive citizens, an MC vote that is influenced by the policy preferences of politically active citizens will also satisfy the policy preferences of a majority of those who are politically inactive. This means that a congressional district is not a salient unit of analysis to test our hypotheses if both the politically active (e.g. voters) and the politically inactive (e.g. non-voters) are on the same side of a policy issue (e.g. both groups support the ACA repeal; or alternatively, both groups oppose the ACA repeal).

The operationalization of a "conflict district" in our study is therefore one in which constituent preference for the direction of action on a policy issue at hand (e.g. ACA repeal) stands in conflict for those who are politically active (in the type of participation included in the specific model, e.g. voters) in comparison to those who are politically inactive (e.g. non-voters). The "conflict" is therefore not merely a statistically significant difference between participators and non-participators in their policy preference on a policy issue. Rather, for a district to be categorized as a "conflict district" for the purpose of our analyses, there is a disagreement in the *course of policy action* (i.e. one group supports "for" and the other group supports "against" on the same policy issue) between those who are politically active (in a specific way, e.g. voters) in comparison to those in the same district who are politically inactive (e.g. non-voters). If policy

congruence is greater for politically active citizens in these conflicted districts, then this would provide robust support for the conclusion that MCs are more responsive to the policy preferences of politically active citizens.

Griffin and Newman (2013) operationalize a “conflict district” as a district in which the relevant groups support opposing policy courses by any margin, meaning one group’s mean policy score is 0.51 and the other is 0.49, or any other unbalanced mean (e.g. 0.90 versus 0.10). We follow this approach in the analyses presented in the manuscript. We also conducted analysis with an additional constraint so that “conflict” is more substantively ascertained by the fact that the two groups on each side of the midpoint must be separated by at least one half standard deviation. Table A1 presents the proportion of conflict districts for each policy issue by political activity, including the “simple” operationalization, as well as the “robust” definition used in additional analyses. The findings presented in the manuscript are based on analyses of the “simple” version, and our analyses of the “robust” definition are fully consistent with these findings.

Table A1. Proportion of conflict districts for each policy issue, by political activity

	ACA Repeal		Keystone		Korean FTA		Simpson-Bowles		Ryan		DADT	
	Robust	Simple	Robust	Simple	Robust	Simple	Robust	Simple	Robust	Simple	Robust	Simple
Vote	34.86	40.14	5.73	13.99	44.95	47.48	41.28	47.94	0.46	3.67	6.42	13.99
Activities	29.36	40.37	8.26	14.22	41.06	47.48	41.28	46.79	0.23	2.52	15.83	19.27
Donation	24.08	36.93	9.63	15.37	48.62	50.23	48.62	50.69	0	2.52	14.22	14.45

Note: entries represent the proportion of conflict districts, i.e. in which participators and non-participators support opposite courses of policy action for each policy issue, and for each political act.

As is evident from Table A1, only the Ryan policy issue lacks a large enough number of conflict districts in order to conduct valid analyses. The reason why the Ryan budget bill has so few conflict districts is because a large majority of public opinion supported only one side of the issue, as evidenced in the fact that 79.4% of the CCES

2012 respondents registered their opposition to the bill. In order for a district to qualify as in “conflict”, it must be the case that those who are politically active support one course of action (e.g. support the Ryan bill) at the same time that those who are politically inactive support the opposite course of policy action (e.g., oppose the Ryan bill). When a large majority of the population supports only one course of policy action – in this case, “oppose” for the Ryan budget bill – it is difficult to robustly test the hypothesis of whether political participation makes a difference for policy outputs, since the majority of participators *and* non-participators overwhelmingly prefer the same policy action.

To summarize the conflict district operationalization in our study, a “conflict district” is one in which those who are politically active in a specific act (e.g. voters) are above the midpoint of the policy approval scale for a specific policy issue, and those who are inactive in that same act (e.g., nonvoters) are below the midpoint of the policy approval scale (and vice versa). Only these conflict districts are analyzed as bases for testing policy congruence between constituents and their representatives.

2. Participation Measures

Our analysis uses measures of self-reported participation in several political activities as well as a validated indicator of voting in the general election. A well-known drawback of the self-reported vote measure is that it tends to suffer from a bias of over-reporting. To remedy this bias, the CCES also includes validated voting data through Catalist, a political data vendor that uses rigorous matching technologies to link survey respondents to their administratively validated voting record (Ansolabahere and Hersh 2012). The weighted mean for the self-reported, non-validated vote measure in the CCES 2012 data is 88.62%, whereas the validated vote measure of 78.97% does not suffer from self-report bias. While this voting rate is still meaningfully higher than the actual turnout

rate of 2012, the weighting procedure in the CCES—based on using matched cases that are weighted to the sampling frame using propensity scores—creates a nationally representative sample of US adults (Ansolabahere and Schaffner 2013: 17).

In addition to the validated voting measure, we constructed an "activities" measure that is coded as "1" if the individual reports engaging in any one of the following three activities in the past year: attending local political meetings, displaying a political sign, or working for a candidate or a campaign (0.326 weighted mean, S.E. 0.002). A third participation measure ("Donating") is coded "1" if the respondent reports making a political contribution over the past year (0.315 weighted mean, S.E. 0.002).

3. Issue Selection

The policy issues for which we have data on policy preferences for both respondents and for their representatives' legislative roll-call votes include: the Ryan Budget Bill (2011 House Budget Plan); "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" (DADT), the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement; the Simpson-Bowles Budget Plan; the Keystone Pipeline; and two votes on repealing the Affordable Care Act. A summary of key characteristics of the roll call votes on each of these issues follows. Four of the roll call votes associated with these issues were especially polarized by party affiliation in terms of the congressional roll-call vote outcome: the Ryan Budget plan, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" and the two Affordable Care Act votes.

Slightly less polarized are the votes on Keystone (which we believe to be an established issue) and Korean Free Trade. Simpson-Bowles is the only vote that was not polarized, largely because nearly every member of Congress voted against it. Following Hill, Jordan and Hurley's model, we expect the Ryan Budget, the Affordable Care Act, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" and Keystone Pipeline votes to follow the Responsible Parties

model, where constituency preferences influence legislator preference, as well as the legislator's roll call vote.

For foreign policy issues, previous research suggests that constituents may have limited information and interest, and legislators tend to have more freedom to deviate from party and constituency opinion (Hill and Hurley 1999). More recent research suggests that Americans' foreign policy attitudes reflect fundamental values and are connected to vote choices—but it is unclear as to whether these connections are dependent on the extent to which elites prime these attitudes through opinion leadership (see, for example, Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida 1989; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Jentleson 1992). As a result, we expect Korean Free Trade to follow a Trustee model, and therefore we should not observe constituency influences.

Finally, we also categorized Simpson-Bowles as a Trustee model issue, because the proposal was a new, unique and “complicated” approach to budgetary policy, with critics on both sides of the aisle. The distinctive approach to the budget was likely reflected in a low level of information about the bill held by the mass public, while the high level of opposition to the bill by elected officials was more complicated than typical budget bills.

Selected details, some provided as CCES documentation, about each roll call are provided below; additional details on public opinion and news coverage of the issues are available upon request.

4. Policy issues surveyed in the 2012 CCES and voted upon in the 112th Congress

*Details on each bill are provided below (note source). Voting records for the House of Representative votes are coded as **For** (Aye), **Against** (Nay), **Did Not Vote** (Abstain).*

Repeal of Affordable Care Act/ Obamacare

- First vote:
 - "Repealing the Job-Killing Health Care Law Act"
 - January 19, 2011
 - Vote number 14
 - H.R. 2
 - Passed: 245-189-1
 - Democrats: 3-189-1
 - Republicans: 242-0-0
- Second Vote:
 - "To repeal the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and health care-related provisions in the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act 2010"
 - July 11, 2012
 - Vote number 460
 - H.R. 6079
 - Passed: 244-185-2
 - Democrats: 5-195-1
 - Republicans: 239-0-1

Keystone Pipeline

"To direct the President to expedite the consideration and approval of the construction and operation of the Keystone XL oil pipeline, and for other purposes..)

- July 26, 2011
- Vote number 650
- H.R. 1938
- Passed: 279-147-1-5
- Democrats: 47-144-0-2
- Republicans: 232-3-1-3

Don't Ask, Don't Tell

Amendment to Defense Appropriations Act, 2012 to prohibit the use of funds in the bill for "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" repeal training materials developed for military chaplains.

- July 8, 2011
- Vote number 528
- H.R. 2219
- Passed: 236-184-12
- Democrats: 9-175-8
- Republicans: 227-9-4

US-Korea Free Trade

"To implement the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement."

- October 12, 2011
- Vote number 783
- H.R. 3080
- Passed: 278-151-4
- Democrats: 59-130-3
- Republicans: 219-21-1

Simpson-Bowles Budget

"Amendment in the nature of a substitute sought to insert the budget proposal endorsed by the Simpson-Bowles Commission."

- March 28, 2012
- Vote number 145
- H.Con.Res. 112, Amendment 1001
- Failed: 38-382-9 (2 present votes)
- Democrats: 22-159-7 (2 present votes)
- Republicans: 16-223-2

Ryan Budget Bill

"Establishing the budget for the United States Government for fiscal year 2012 and setting forth appropriate budgetary levels for fiscal years 2013 through 2021."

- April 15, 2011
- Vote number 277
- H.Con.Res. 34
- Passed: 235-193-4
- Democrats: 0-189-3
- Republicans: 235-4-1

5. Win ratio analyses

Table A2. Effect of political activities and copartisanship on additive win ratio
Sample of districts that conflict for all acts; same baseline n for all models
(72% of full sample)


	(1) Vote	(2) Vote * Co-partisan	(3) Donate	(4) Donate * Co-partisan	(5) Activities	(6) Activities * Co-partisan
Vote	0.086 (0.539)	-1.813** (0.639)				
Co-partisan		-0.829 (1.015)		2.498*** (0.535)		2.640*** (0.570)
Vote * Co-partisan		5.119*** (1.130)				
Donate			-1.357** (0.461)	-3.332*** (0.576)		
Donate * Co-partisan				4.843*** (0.823)		
Activities					-0.084 (0.475)	-1.601** (0.611)
Activities * Co-partisan						3.607*** (0.863)
Constant	50.876*** (0.591)	51.107*** (0.660)	51.080*** (0.493)	50.210*** (0.548)	50.777*** (0.502)	49.864*** (0.560)
Observations	32709	32709	31343	31343	31343	31343
Adjusted R^2	-0.000	0.007	0.001	0.009	-0.000	0.008

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 1. Differences between Participants and Non-participants in Policy Support⁴¹


A. Policy issue support: ACA Repeal



Numbers represent N.


⁴¹ Note: “Vote” is validated vote in general election; “Donate” is whether respondent reports having made a political contribution in the past year; and “Activities” refers to whether the respondent reports having attended a political meeting, done campaign work or displayed a political sign in the past year.

B. Policy issue support: Don't Ask, Don't Tell "Repeal"




Numbers represent N.

C. Policy issue support: Keystone



Numbers represent N.

D. Policy issue support: Simpson-Bowles



E. Policy issue support: Korean Free Trade






Figure 2. Policy Congruence of Participants and Non-participants, by Issue⁴²

A. Policy congruence: ACA Repeal




⁴² Note: respondents are coded as congruent (coded "1") on a policy issue when their policy preference on a policy issue is consistent with the roll call vote of their elected representative on the issue. Respondents are coded as "non-congruent" (coded "0") when their policy preference on a policy issue differs from the roll call vote of their elected representatives. "Vote" is validated vote in general election; "Donate" is whether respondent reports having made a political contribution in the past year; and "Activities" refers to whether the respondent reports having attended a political meeting, done campaign work or displayed a political sign in the past year.


B. Policy congruence: Don't Ask, Don't Tell "Repeal"



C. Policy congruence: Keystone




D. Policy congruence: Simpson-Bowles



Numbers represent N.

E. Policy congruence: Korean Free Trade



Numbers represent N.

Figure 3. The ACA, Voting and Co-partisanship: Marginal Effects

Note: Marginal effects are plotted using the estimates reported in Table 1, Model 2.






Figure 4. The ACA, Non-voting Participation and Co-partisanship: Marginal Effects

Note: Marginal effects plotted using the estimates reported in Table 2, Models 2 and 4.

A. Donating




B. Other Non-voting Activities




Note: “Donating” is whether respondent reports having made a political contribution in the past year; “Non-voting Activities” refers to whether the respondent reports having attended a political meeting, done campaign work or displayed a political sign in the past year.

Figure 5. Policy Support by Income



Numbers represent N.

Figure 6. Policy Congruence and Income



Numbers represent N.

Figure 7. The ACA, Voting, Co-partisanship and Income: Marginal Effects

Note: Marginal effects are plotted using the estimates reported in Table 3, Model 1.




Figure 8. The ACA, Voters, Non-voting Participation, and Income: Marginal Effects

Note: Marginal effects are plotted using the estimates reported in Table 3, Model 3.





Figure 9. ACA Policy Congruence: Participation, Income and Co-partisanship⁴³

9A. Co-partisans



⁴³ The participation index is constructed by adding the three behaviors analyzed separately in prior models: “Vote”, a validated vote in general election; “Donate”, whether respondent reports having made a political contribution in the past year; and “Activities”, whether the respondent reports having attended a political meeting, done campaign work or displayed a political sign in the past year.

9B. Non-co-partisans




Table 1. Simple Models of Policy Congruence: The Election/Selection Linkage

	ACA		Keystone		DADT		Simpson-Bowles		Korean FTA	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Voted	0.289*** (0.082)		0.507** (0.182)		-0.190 (0.180)		-0.086 (0.071)		0.095 (0.066)	
Voted		-0.078 (0.098)		0.499* (0.200)		0.059 (0.187)		-0.126 (0.082)		0.046 (0.077)
Co-partisan		0.819*** (0.118)		-0.015 (0.237)		-1.067** (0.341)		0.030 (0.107)		-0.049 (0.101)
Voted * Co-partisan		0.889*** (0.131)		0.023 (0.272)		-0.446 (0.340)		0.100 (0.122)		0.140 (0.118)
Constant	-0.144* (0.057)	-0.378*** (0.070)	-0.205* (0.101)	-0.200 (0.118)	0.256 (0.146)	0.598*** (0.153)	0.056 (0.050)	0.047 (0.061)	-0.038 (0.047)	-0.024 (0.057)
n	17591	17591	4765	4765	2661	2661	21321	21321	21585	21585

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 2. ACA and Keystone: The Plausibility of the Communication Linkage

	ACA				Keystone			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Donate	0.084 (0.075)	-0.379*** (0.092)			0.124 (0.174)	-0.094 (0.224)		
Co-partisan		1.230*** (0.083)		1.304*** (0.077)		0.096 (0.136)		0.068 (0.144)
Donate * Co-partisan		1.516*** (0.168)				0.520* (0.246)		
Activity (1 of 3)			0.226** (0.071)	-0.066 (0.087)			0.319 (0.174)	0.216 (0.211)
Activity * Co-partisan				0.711*** (0.156)				0.239 (0.239)
Constant	0.004 (0.036)	-0.396*** (0.046)	-0.054 (0.034)	-0.465*** (0.043)	-0.033 (0.123)	-0.069 (0.145)	-0.120 (0.116)	-0.148 (0.139)
n	15778	15778	17108	17108	5054	5054	4569	4569

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3. ACA Policy Congruence: Voting, Non-voting Participation, and Income

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Vote	-0.085 (0.101)	-0.131 (0.113)	-0.020 (0.127)
Co-partisan	0.903*** (0.145)	0.651*** (0.168)	1.587*** (0.196)
Vote * co-partisan	0.947*** (0.161)	0.748*** (0.209)	0.707*** (0.193)
Income (cent. Log)	-0.052 (0.063)	-0.003 (0.067)	0.050 (0.089)
Co-partisan * income	0.717*** (0.125)	0.519*** (0.137)	0.472** (0.150)
Activities (1 of 3)		0.149 (0.101)	0.232* (0.109)
Activities * co-partisan		0.103 (0.205)	0.087 (0.209)
Donate		-0.560*** (0.101)	-0.669*** (0.113)
Donate * co-partisan		1.391*** (0.228)	1.502*** (0.234)
Education			-0.061* (0.031)
Age			0.005 (0.003)
Gender			-0.185* (0.077)
Rep			-1.192*** (0.141)
Dem			-1.352*** (0.102)
Race: African American			-0.015 (0.151)
Race: Hispanic			0.491** (0.190)
Race: Other Non-White			0.277 (0.196)
Constant	-0.455*** (0.081)	-0.360*** (0.091)	0.217 (0.230)
n	13530	10989	10470

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4. ACA Policy Congruence: Participation, Income and Partisanship⁴⁴

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PI = 1	0.127 (0.069)	-0.003 (0.076)	-0.044 (0.080)	-0.106 (0.094)
PI = 2	0.251** (0.083)	0.132 (0.087)	0.028 (0.095)	-0.319** (0.117)
PI = 3	0.308*** (0.082)	0.174* (0.085)	0.109 (0.097)	-0.337** (0.130)
Co-partisan		1.415*** (0.065)	1.393*** (0.069)	0.985*** (0.111)
Income			0.135** (0.046)	-0.036 (0.085)
PI=1 * income				0.012 (0.106)
PI=2 * income				0.060 (0.149)
PI=3 * income				-0.345 (0.189)
PI=1 * co-partisan				0.309* (0.136)
PI=2 * co-partisan				1.224*** (0.167)
PI=3 * co-partisan				2.113*** (0.237)
Co-partisan * income				0.584*** (0.105)
Constant	-0.049 (0.048)	-0.430*** (0.055)	-0.396*** (0.058)	-0.290*** (0.068)
Observations	20368	20368	17921	17921
Adjusted R ²				

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

⁴⁴ Participation index (PI): additive index of the three behaviors analyzed separately in prior models: “Vote”, a validated vote in general election; “Donate”, whether respondent reports having made a political contribution in the past year; and “Activities”, whether the respondent reports having attended a political meeting, done campaign work or displayed a political sign in the past year.